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Abstract
We present new data documenting medieval Europe’s “Commercial Revolution” using infor-
mation on the establishment of markets in Germany. We use these data to test whether medieval
universities played a causal role in expanding economic activity, examining the foundation of
Germany’s first universities after 1386 following the Papal Schism. We find that the trend rate of
market establishment breaks upward in 1386 and that this break is greatest where the distance
to a university shrank most. There is no differential pre-1386 trend associated with the reduc-
tion in distance to a university, and there is no break in trend in 1386 where university proximity
did not change. These results are robust to estimating a variety of specifications that address
concerns about the endogeneity of university location. Universities provided training in newly-
rediscovered Roman and canon law; students with legal training served in positions that reduced
the uncertainty of trade in the Middle Ages. We argue that training in the law, and the consequent
development of legal and administrative institutions, was an important channel linking universi-
ties and greater economic activity in medieval Germany.
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1 Introduction
The late Middle Ages saw the first stirrings of the “Rise of the West.”1 Between the years 900 and
1500, Europe experienced a Commercial Revolution and awoke from centuries of economic slumber,
with cities growing and trade expanding. This flowering of the European economy set the stage
for modern Europe’s exploration and colonization of the world, and its institutional and political
development on the path toward modern growth.
Economic historians have documented this story of remarkable change using a variety of sources:
from the rise of fairs (Epstein, 2000), to the physical expansion of cities (Verhulst, 1999), the increased
output of books (Buringh and van Zanden, 2009), or the growth of population and urbanization
(McEvedy and Jones, 1979; Bairoch et al., 1988). While informative, the existing data on the Commer-
cial Revolution are often limited in their frequency, in their geographic coverage, or in their ability
to capture economic change directly, making them difficult to use for identifying the causal factors
that transformed Europe from a poor, rural, backward society (relative to the Chinese and Islamic
civilizations), into an urban and commercial one.2
The Middle Ages saw not only economic transformation in Europe, but also the establishment
of the first universities—first in Bologna in the 11th century, then fifty more in the following four
centuries—and the development of formal legal institutions and state administrative systems. In
this paper we consider the causal role that educational and legal institutions may have played in
promoting economic activity.
We begin by addressing the paucity of direct, systematic and quantitative evidence on the tim-
ing and spread of the Commercial Revolution. We present data on the establishment dates of 2,256
German3 cities, as well as the dates when these cities received grants to hold markets. We present a
range of evidence suggesting that grants to hold markets are valid indicators of increased economic
activity. The markets established under the grants took a variety of forms, and they were granted to
1See, for example, Lopez (1976), North and Thomas (1973), Buringh and van Zanden (2009).
2Morris (2010), among others, ranks China’s economic development in the Song Dynasty (960–1279 A.D.) ahead of
Europe’s and Mokyr (1990, ch. 9) explicitly compares Chinese and European technologies, noting China’s “technological
supremacy” in the Middle Ages (p. 209). Bosker and van Zanden (2008) compare urbanization rates between Western
Europe and the Arab world, and show that they were much higher in the latter until the late Middle Ages.
3The modern state of Germany did not exist in the period under consideration; our data cover the regions of Germany
within its 1937 borders (excluding East and West Prussia, which were not considered part of the Holy Roman Empire). For
brevity, we use the anachronism “Germany” throughout the paper.
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cities large and small. This dataset thus captures economic changes in medieval Europe that occurred
inside and outside major urban areas, spanning a large region, over a long period of time.
The primary purpose of this paper is to use these data on market grants to test whether univer-
sities had a causal effect on economic activity in medieval Europe.4 We study the effects of a unique
natural experiment in university establishment: Church politics—the Papal Schism of the late 14th
century—resulted in the arguably exogenous foundation of Germany’s first universities, and greatly
increased Germans’ access to university training.5 Historical university matriculation records reveal
that that the establishment of these new universities led to a sharp increase—a tripling—in the num-
ber of Germans with some university training.
We present a simple model linking human capital to market establishment, which generates an
estimating equation and clear predictions regarding market establishment in Germany around the
time of the Schism. In particular, we predict that there should be an increase in the trend rate of
market establishment after the first German university was established in 1386, and that this break in
the trend should be greater in cities with greater reductions in distance to a university. We test these
predictions using our data on market establishment and find strong support for them across a broad
range of specifications. There is a significant positive break in the trend rate of market establishment
in Germany in 1386; moreover, the break is larger in areas experiencing greater reductions in distance
to a university. Importantly, there is no differential pre-1386 trend associated with the reduction in
distance to a university, and there is no break in the trend rate of market establishment in 1386 where
university proximity did not change. We check whether there is evidence of trend breaks in years
other than 1386 and find that our findings are quite specific to the time when universities were first
established.
While the timing of the Schism was plausibly exogenous with respect to economic conditions, the
4It is worthwhile to state explicitly that the question underlying this paper is whether universities played some causal
role in increasing economic activity in the Middle Ages, rather than rather than playing the ultimate causal role in driving
all of the economic change in the period. The causal effect of higher educational institutions on growth has, of course, been
studied in other settings. For example, Aghion et al. (2009) study the impact of higher education spending on growth in
the contemporary United States, and find a significant positive effect of 4-year college spending across all states, and of
research-related spending in states close to the technological frontier.
5Of course, even if the establishment of universities in 14th century Germany was exogenous with respect to commercial
activity, one might still wonder about the external validity of the effect we estimate. We believe that the “local” treatment
effect we identify in 14th century Germany is informative about the role played by universities and human capital in
medieval Europe more generally; we further discuss external validity in the paper’s Conclusion.
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locations of the first universities may have been selected according to their economic characteristics.
We thus examine whether endogenous university establishment might explain our results. We drop
all cities within 20 km or 50 km of universities, and use information on the identity of each city’s
ruling lord to drop cities in the same territory as a university. We also consider regional differences
between cities experiencing an increase in access to a university in 1386 and those that do not: we
drop cities close to the Rhine, and cities east of the Elbe; estimate a model that allows the underlying
trend rate of economic activity to vary with longitude; finally, we estimate the effects of university
establishment exploiting only within-state variation. In each specification, we find evidence that the
new universities affected market establishment.
The Middle Ages were a period that saw many political changes, some of which coincided with
the establishment of Germany’s first universities, and might also have affected patterns of market
establishment. We examine the effects of changes in lords’ jurisdiction over cities, by excluding cities
that experienced jurisdictional changes and subsequent market establishment from our analysis; we
also drop cities in Wu¨rttemberg, where city conflicts were prevalent in the late 14th century. One
particular concern is that the Papal Schism may have affected economic outcomes through channels
other than university establishment. We thus drop cities aligned with the French (rather than Ro-
man) Pope. In all of these specifications we find that our results are unchanged. We also conduct
falsification exercises, examining market establishment trends in England and Italy, where the Papal
Schism would have had political effects, but did not lead to the creation of new universities. We do
not see changes in the rate of market establishment in either of these contexts.
Germany’s first universities may have affected trade through several channels, but we present
historical evidence indicating that the role of universities in developing legal and administrative
institutions was likely an important one: universities trained lawyers, who became administrators,
codified laws and regulations, and staffed and guided others through the legal systems that they
helped to develop.6 Our analysis of the institutional environment of late medieval Germany, the
6Murphy et al. (1991) argue that more lawyers are harmful for growth, but their focus is on the contemporary era
of modern (Schumpeterian) economic growth, driven by the innovation of new technologies. In that context, training
engineers and scientists, rather than lawyers, is likely to be associated with increased economic activity. Our focus is on an
era in which Smithian growth, driven by the expansion of trade and the division of labor, was paramount. In this setting,
reducing the uncertainty of property rights through the development of a system of laws, and the training of lawyers to
apply them, could certainly be conducive to economic activity. Moreover, Murphy et al. (1991) cite the increased protection
of property rights discussed by North and Thomas (1973) as an example of reduced taxes on productive activity that should
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introduction of Roman legal thinking in that period, and the careers of university-trained jurists
supports this view.
The importance of institutional change for Europe’s commercial revival has been highlighted
by many scholars: Greif (1994), building on his analysis of informal contract enforcement among
Maghribi traders (Greif, 1989, 1993), emphasizes the role of formal institutions in supporting the
larger-scale economic exchange that occurred in late medieval Europe.7 DeLong and Shleifer (1993)
emphasize the importance of constraints on executive power, which were developed in some of the
new city-states that arose in the Middle Ages; Guiso et al. (2008, p. 9) describe how, with the rise of
the institution of the free city-state in medieval Italy, “personal freedoms receive[d] legal protection
against abuses of government officials, whose actions [were] subject to control of ad hoc institutions,
including courts of law to which citizens could appeal.”8 Epstein (2000) similarly points to important
administrative changes underlying the expansion of commercial activity. Van Zanden (2009) follows
Berman (1983) in arguing that the development of European legal systems in the Middle Ages set the
stage for Europe’s political and economic development. Finally, Huff (2003) argues that the European
university was an institution that was uniquely suited to promoting technical change, and that the
rise of universities can be seen as an important institutional turning point in the history of European
science.9
Existing work on medieval Europe has presented rich historical descriptions of the association
between institutional and economic change, but has seldom been able to test for the presence of a
causal link. North and Thomas (1973, p. 12), while viewing institutional change as a crucial factor in
Europe’s economic development, write that “The revival of trade and commerce in the eleventh and
increase income. Kuran (2011) and Cos¸gel (2011) view the development of legal institutions as playing an important role
in expanding trade in another historical setting: the Islamic world in the 8th and 9th centuries. They also point to a lack
of further development in legal institutions in subsequent centuries as playing a crucial role in later economic stagnation.
See also the essays in Ma and van Zanden (2011) for studies of the importance of formal legal institutions for economic
development in a broad range of historical contexts.
7Greif (1994, p. 936) writes, “To support collective actions and to facilitate exchange, an individualist society needs
to develop formal legal and political enforcement organizations. Further, a formal legal code is likely to be required to
facilitate exchange by coordinating expectations and enhancing the deterrence effect of formal organizations.” See also
Greif (2006).
8Guiso et al. (2008) argue that the free city-states also developed high levels of social capital, which then persisted into
the modern era, affecting the growth rates of the (formerly) free cities.
9At the same time, it is clear that factors other than institutional change were also important to Europe’s economic
revival: for example, Mokyr (1990, ch. 3) discusses the important technological improvements that took place in the Middle
Ages, and Morris (2010) focuses on climate change—the Medieval Warm Period—that made agriculture more productive.
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twelfth centuries led not only to the proliferation of towns but to a host of institutional arrangements
designed to reduce market imperfections. As new towns developed their own governments for ad-
ministration and protection, they necessarily evolved bodies of law to adjudicate disputes arising
from these new conditions.” The institutions that reduced market imperfections and increased trade
in the Middle Ages were likely both cause and consequence of increased economic activity. Our work
attempts to disentangle this causal relationship.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the Commercial Revolution,
presenting data collected by other scholars that point to a dramatic change in Europe’s economy, and
presenting and discussing our newly-collected data on economic change in late medieval Germany.
In Section 3, we discuss the rise of universities in Europe during the Commercial Revolution, how
the Papal Schism can be seen as an exogenous shock leading to the foundation of new universities
in Germany, and present data on the effect of the new universities on the number of Germans with
university training. In Section 4, we present a simple model of the link between universities and
and market establishment, and derive our empirical strategy. In Section 5 we use our data on market
establishment to test for a causal effect of the new universities on commercial activity. In Section 6, we
propose that the mechanism linking university establishment to commercial activity was the training
of jurists and the development of legal institutions. We discuss the importance of the development of
formal legal institutions for supporting economic activity in the Middle Ages, then present historical
evidence on the training and careers of lawyers in medieval Germany, arguing that individuals with
legal training played an important role in supporting economic activity. In Section 7, we discuss our
findings and offer some concluding thoughts.
2 Documenting the Commercial Revolution
2.1 Existing Evidence
Beginning around the tenth century, there was a revival of trade in Europe.10 Increased trade and im-
proved farming technology (which produced agricultural surpluses) allowed for larger urban pop-
10After the decline of the (Western) Roman Empire (in 476), there was little trade throughout Western Europe. There
seems to have been a revival of economic activity in the Carolingian Empire, but it was not sustained. See van Zanden
(2009).
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ulations. Robert Lopez (1976, p. 56) describes the Commercial Revolution as follows: “When food
surpluses increased, it became possible to release more people for governmental, religious, and cul-
tural pursuits. Towns re-emerged from their protracted depression. Merchants and craftsmen were
able to do more than providing a fistful of luxuries for the rich.”11
Unfortunately, only very limited data for the period are available to support this narrative.12 To
compare economic development across European regions during the Middle Ages, Buringh and van
Zanden (2009) rely on the fraction of a region’s population living in cities with populations greater
than 10,000 and on manuscript production. Each should be correlated with the volume of economic
activity: higher urbanization rates depend on trade, as goods must move from the country to the
city; manuscript production would have been greater when incomes were higher and the demand
for books (a luxury) was greater.13 In Figure 1, we present Buringh and van Zanden’s (2009) data on
these indicators of economic activity. They clearly reveal the dramatic changes experienced in Europe
between the years 900 and 1500: in 900, Western Europe had only about 1% of its population living
in cities with more than 10,000 people; by 1500, the urbanization rate for Western Europe stood at
over 8%, with peaks of over 10% and 20% in the Netherlands and in Belgium, respectively. Similarly,
manuscript production soared in the late Middle Ages, rising from less than 100,000 manuscripts per
century to over 4 million.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 matches the narrative presented above: Europe changed dramatically between 900 and
1500. Yet, the data presented are extremely coarse measures of economic change, available only at
long time intervals, for a small number of regions. Even data available at the city level, for example,
the Bairoch et al. (1988) data used by Buringh and Van Zanden (2009), are generally limited to one ob-
servation of a city’s population per century, in an unbalanced panel with relatively few observations.
In the case of Germany, population data are available for only 21 cities in the year 1200, increasing to
11Some scholars have argued that no sustained increases of income per capita occurred before 1800 (Clark, 2007). Still,
even in a Malthusian world economic change is of great interest, as it may indicate an out-of-equilibrium period of higher
income, or a transition to a new, higher-income equilibrium. In addition, institutional and economic changes in the Middle
Ages may have had persistent consequences (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005).
12There is rich historical and archaeological evidence on the Commercial Revolution (for example, Verhulst, 1999), but it
is often not in a form that allows for the testing of quantitative hypotheses.
13DeLong and Shleifer (1993) use city growth as a measure of economic development, and Acemoglu et al. (2005) and
Acemoglu et al. (2011) use urbanization rates.
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128 cities in 1500. Furthermore, these data miss the developments that likely affected most Europeans
at the time: the establishment of local markets and incorporation of smaller towns and cities.14
2.2 New Evidence on the Commercial Revolution in Germany
The Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, a series of volumes edited by Erich Keyser (1939–1964), compiles, for all
of Germany, information on each incorporated city, including the date it was first mentioned in a
document, the date it was formally incorporated, and the dates when it received one or more “market
privileges” from the Emperor or a local lord to hold markets or fairs (the spatial distribution within
Central Europe of the 2,256 cities included in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch is displayed in Figure 2).15
[Figure 2 about here]
The market privilege (or market right) was an official document that gave a city the right to hold
a specific market (or fair); it also gave the local lord the right to tax trade in that market, and to coin
money and to require its use in the market. In exchange for these rights, it required the lord to guar-
antee the protection of merchants en route to, and present at, the market—this included the provision
of courts and the establishment of standard measures.16 Many cities received multiple market rights,
often granted in different years; the various grants established markets held on different dates or
specializing in different products. Thus, a market right indicated that a city had the right to hold
an additional market, but not necessarily the first market in a city or town (or a general right to hold
markets); indeed, in some cities, the first market right was recognized since ancient times, or was
granted when the city was formally incorporated. For all 2,256 cities in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, we
collected data on their date of incorporation, and on all of the years in which they were granted one
or more market privileges, throughout the Middle Ages.
14Epstein (2000, p. 74) notes that “[t]he daily and weekly markets where most small-scale retailing took place” are often
ignored by scholars. Britnell (2009, p. 189) writes that “In the early days of urbanization, [village markets and small market
towns] were the principal supporters of the growth of trade in the absence of earlier urbanized traditions. But they were not
simply substitute for large towns or symbols of backwardness. They were numerous even in the most urbanized regions.
. . . In the early fourteenth century they had a dual function, both serving the needs of local residents and acting as a source
of supply for middlemen and other merchants.”
15To be included, a “city” must have been incorporated prior to the compilation of the Sta¨dtebuch; the sizes of these cities
today vary greatly from several hundred inhabitants to millions. Missing information, and uncertainty regarding some
dates are undeniable problems. However, it is generally clear when there is such uncertainty, and we do not include in our
analysis market or city establishments whose dates are uncertain.
16Epstein (2000, p. 82); Britnell (1978, p. 192); Schmieder (2005, p. 49).
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Conceivably, in some instances market grants may indicate changes in the formality of economic
institutions, rather than changes in economic activity itself. However, a variety of data and historical
sources validate the granting of a market right as an indicator of increased economic activity.17 First,
one can examine the association between city sizes and the granting of market rights. Using the
Bairoch dataset (Bairoch et al., 1988), we find for both years 1400 and 1500 strong, positive correlations
between receiving market grants in the Middle Ages and various measures of city size (see the online
appendix, Table OA.1).
Second, we examined historical sources to determine whether the granting of a market right
was associated with other observable indicators of economic activity in the historical record. The
Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch (Keyser, 1939–1974) and the Handbuch der historischen Sta¨tten Deutschlands (Klose,
ed, 1958–) provide descriptions of notable new construction in each German city. We examined the
historical construction records for the 63 cities receiving one or more market grants between 1386 and
1406—this period, covering the twenty years following the establishment of the first German univer-
sity, is the focus of our empirical analysis of the impact of universities on market establishment. We
find that 30 of these cities experienced some notable construction within 20 years of the year of the
market grant or city incorporation (see the online appendix, Table OA.2).18 For example, the city of
Bacharach received a market grant in 1402. Around that time, a customs house was built and the city
walls were extended to accommodate it. Then, five years after the market grant, a new city hall was
built on the market square. Seventeen years after the market right was granted, a new merchants’ hall
was constructed. Overall, it appears that substantial new construction activity followed the granting
of a medieval market right, suggesting real effects of the grant.19
Finally, we consulted a report on the markets existing in Germany in 1936, Verzeichnis der Ma¨rkte
und Messen im Deutschen Reich im Jahre 1936 (Statistisches Reichsamt, ed, 1935) and matched the mar-
17We discuss the sources described here in more detail in the online appendix, Section OA.1.
18If we include also the 17 cities that were incorporated between 1386 and 1406 (and thus likely were granted the right
to hold a market together with the act of incorporation), 38 of these 80 cities experienced notable construction within 20
years of receiving the grant. We also randomly selected 80 comparison cities that did not receive a market grant or city
incorporation between 1386 and 1406, and searched for evidence of construction activity in these cities between 1386 and
1426 (a conservative, 40-year time window). We found evidence of construction in only 23 of these 80 cities—the difference
in construction activity between cities receiving market grants within a twenty-year window and control cities within a
forty-year window is statistically significant at the 5% level.
19We discuss additional examples of construction following the granting of a market right in the online appendix, Sec-
tion OA.1.
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kets in the report to the market establishments in our dataset between 1386 and 1406. We find that
60 of the 63 cities receiving market grants from 1386–1406 had functioning markets in 1936 (see the
online appendix, Table OA.2). Among these 60 cities, the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch provided informa-
tion on the frequency of the market, and/or the goods traded there, for 50 of their medieval market
grants. Of these 50 grants, we are able to successfully match 39 of them across 500 years on at least one
market characteristic (frequency or goods traded), with no mismatch; moreover, in 14 cases, we find
that the market existing in 1936 exactly matches the 14th (or early 15th) century market grant in both
the frequency and type of market (see the online appendix, Table OA.2). Thus, based on a range of
historical evidence, we are confident that the granting of a market right actually indicates increased
commercial activity.20
In Figure 3 we show the number of city incorporations and market establishments between 1100
and 1500. The top graph displays absolute numbers of incorporations and market grants in 10-year
moving averages; the bottom graph displays the cumulative number of cities incorporated or mar-
kets established at each point in time. The figure reveals a dramatic rise in city incorporations in
the German lands in the 13th century; the average number of cities incorporated per year increased
from less than one to approximately four. The granting of market rights also accelerated during the
13th century, albeit more slowly. During the 14th century, the comovement of city incorporations
and market grants becomes evident, indicating a clear tendency toward both greater urbanization
and expanded economic activity, a tendency which is not even reversed by the arrival of the Black
Death of 1348. Toward the end of the 14th century, however, the two series begin to diverge. City in-
corporations subside, while the number of markets granted per year remains high, varying between
approximately 2–6 markets per year.
[Figure 3 about here]
The data displayed in Figure 3 provide a lens on commercial activity and urbanization that was
experienced over the whole of Germany, not merely in its largest cities. The underlying, disaggregate
20We are not the first to treat the granting of a market privilege as an event marking market establishment. The work
of historians of medieval Europe studying such grants supports the view that royal charters were often associated with
the actual creation of new markets, and were not simply the formal recognition of existing ones. Bindseil and Pfeil (1999,
pp. 739-740) write that “The setting up of a marketplace became a legal privilege of the German King in the 9th century,
implying the need of a deed of foundation for every market.” Britnell (1981, p. 211) and Masschaele (2002) discuss the case
of England; Epstein (2000) uses legal documents as indicators of economic activity in Italy.
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information on literally hundreds of distinct changes in economic activity—market establishments
and city incorporations—allows us to test hypotheses that would be difficult to evaluate using other,
much coarser measures of economic outcomes.
3 University Establishment in Medieval Europe
3.1 Universities and the Commercial Revolution
At precisely the time when it experienced its Commercial Revolution, Europe also saw the creation
of its first universities.21 The first university, the University of Bologna, was founded in the eleventh
century by foreign students who were receiving training in the law: the Justinian Code of Roman civil
law had just been rediscovered at this time, and Bologna had become a preeminent site of legal schol-
arship. Students in Bologna, many of them foreigners, formed a corporation of scholars (universitas)
to obtain official recognition and protection of their rights.
Universities spread rapidly throughout Europe during the period of the Commercial Revolution.
There were no universities in all of Europe before the Commercial Revolution began in the tenth cen-
tury. By the year 1500, there were more than fifty (Verger, 1992, pp. 62–65). Throughout the Middle
Ages, the number of universities is highly correlated with contemporaneous levels of urbanization,
as we show in the online appendix, Section OA.2.22 In Table 1, we provide a list of some of the
universities founded in the Middle Ages, along with their foundation dates.
[Table 1 about here]
These medieval universities may have supported economic activity during the Commercial Rev-
olution through a variety of channels: first, they generated increased human capital: training in the
liberal arts was comprised of logic, grammar and rhetoric (the trivium) as well as arithmetic, geome-
try, music, and astronomy (the quadrivium), skills that may have been commercially useful.23 Second,
they encouraged the formation of networks of mobile individuals who spoke Latin, and who were
21General references on the medieval universities include Rashdall (1895) and DeRidder-Symoens, ed (1992).
22Abramson and Boix (2012) show that urbanization and universities remain positively correlated in the early modern
period.
23Dittmar (2011) argues that numeracy was crucial to merchants’ commercial success in early modern Europe.
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trained in common subjects, using common texts. Perhaps most importantly, medieval universities
trained a large number of individuals in canon and civil law (as we discuss in much more detail in
Section 6). This specific type of human capital was especially important in medieval Europe, where
the development of civil, administrative and merchant law, the staffing of courts, and the enforce-
ment of contracts was critical to solving the “fundamental problem of exchange” (Greif, 2000): the
resolution of uncertainty in economic transactions due to highly disaggregated political institutions,
high costs of transportation and communication, and thus high risk of expropriation by the state or
by one’s agent.24
Of course, the development of legal and educational institutions was very much a response to im-
proving economic conditions—this was certainly true of medieval universities. Without identifying
a source of exogenous variation in the establishment of universities, it is difficult to credibly establish
a causal link between them and increased economic activity.
3.2 The Papal Schism as a Natural Experiment in University Establishment
Throughout the Middle Ages, until 1386, German students had to travel abroad, to the universities
of Paris, Bologna, Prague, or other cities, to receive a university education—there were not yet any
German universities.25 Rashdall (1895, p. 212) writes that in the 12th and 13th centuries, “Germany
was too far behind the rest of Europe in culture and civilization for the spontaneous development of
a University.” As Germany developed and demand for university training increased, constraints on
the supply of universities remained binding. During the 14th century, the Church wished to limit the
number of sites of theological and canon law training in order to monitor teaching and prevent the
spread of heresy, thus constraining university establishment; Rashdall (1895, p. 236) writes of popes’
“policy of confining theological graduation to Paris.”26 In addition to political constraints on uni-
24See Greif (1993, 2000, 2006), Greif et al. (1994), and van Zanden (2009) for discussions of the institutions developed to
solve problems of insecure property rights and uncertain contract enforcement in the Middle Ages.
25Prague was part of the Holy Roman Empire. However, in following the convention of this paper, we use the anachro-
nism “German” to refer only to the territory covered by our dataset, which does not encompass Prague and the Kingdom
of Bohemia.
26Thijssen (1998) studies academic censure for heresy at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages. Cantoni and Yucht-
man (2013) discuss the political economy of university establishment in medieval Europe more broadly, focusing on spir-
itual and secular lords’ general support of university education due (especially) to the usefulness of legally-trained uni-
versity graduates in administrative roles. Although it typically supported university education (by subsidizing study and
hiring large numbers of graduates), the Church initially forbade university study, and always closely monitored teaching
to prevent heterodoxy.
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versity establishment, the supply of faculty was another important constraint on German university
establishment prior to the Papal Schism, as the historical absence of any German universities meant
that Germany’s scholars had long been based in universities abroad.
Between 1386 and 1392, however, there were three universities established in Germany: one in
Heidelberg (founded in 1386), one in Cologne (1388), and one in Erfurt (1392).27 The reason for the
sudden foundation of several German universities was the Papal Schism, which both relaxed the
the political constraint on university establishment, and also the constraint of limited faculty in the
German lands.
From 1309 to 1378, a period known as the “Avignon Papacy,” popes resided in Avignon, France,
rather than in Rome. In 1378, Pope Gregory XI moved the Papal Court back to Rome, and died shortly
thereafter. The election to replace Gregory XI resulted first in the selection of Pope Urban VI, who
remained in Rome, and then in the selection of Clement VII, who maintained his court in Avignon.
Thus, beginning in 1378, there were two rival popes; secular lords chose to pledge allegiance to one
or the other. France and Spain were loyal to the French pope, while the Holy Roman Empire and the
Italian states were loyal to Rome.28
The split in the Church had important consequences for university students and faculty from
Germany. Because there were no German universities at the time of the Schism, many of them had
studied and taught at French universities, such as the universities of Paris and Orle´ans. However, for
theological reasons, in the years following the Schism, the French universities became increasingly
intolerant of individuals loyal to the Roman pope, as were German students and faculty. The Univer-
sity of Paris (Western Europe’s preeminent center of scholarship on canon law and theology) issued
a formal declaration in support of Clement VII in February 1383; Swanson (1979, pp. 68–74) writes of
the “exodus” of Germans from Paris and the “the decline of the German nation at the University of
Orleans” at that time.
Forced to leave the French universities, students and faculty returned to Germany, where univer-
sities were established to take them in. Importantly, the Roman Pope’s political constraint on univer-
27Another university of the Holy Roman Empire, the University of Vienna, was officially established in 1365, but little
actual teaching began until after the Schism (in 1383). In addition, the University of Leipzig was founded in 1409.
28Some exceptions to this pattern are described in Swanson (1979); we discuss the minority of German cities that were
aligned with the Avignon Pope below.
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sity establishment (in order to maintain orthodoxy) was loosened by the Schism, because Rome had
lost the University of Paris’ allegiance. Indeed, Rome not only needed to make up for the loss of the
University of Paris, but also wished to compete with it. The rise of universities in Germany “gained
further strength from the Schism, since the Roman Popes were always ready to grant the necessary
bulls [establishing universities] as a means of weakening Paris, the great champion of the Avignon
Pontiffs” (Rashdall, 1895, p. 247).
The increased supply of eminent German scholars was also of critical importance, attracting other
faculty and the first students to the new universities. Marsilius of Inghen, first rector of the University
of Heidelberg, was a former rector in Paris and “one of the strong Urbanists who had left the Univer-
sity” (Rashdall, 1895, p. 248). Another of the early rectors at Heidelberg was Conrad of Gelnhausen,
“among the Germans who left Paris when Louis of Anjou clamped down on the university” (Swan-
son, 1979, pp. 211–212).29 Thus, while there was certainly demand for university training among
German students, it took the (supply) shock of the Schism to transform Germany’s educational insti-
tutions.
The Papal Schism of 1378 produced a sharp change in university establishment in Germany; in a
brief period of time, the distance to a university, and so the cost of university attendance, shrank sig-
nificantly for individuals across Germany. For the median city, the distance to the nearest university
shrank by around 200 kilometers following the establishment of the first three German universities—
the shade of city markers on the map in Figure 2 indicates the change in distance to a university that
resulted from the new universities’ establishment (darker colors indicate a larger change in distance).
Importantly, the Schism represented a source of variation in the creation of universities the timing
of which was arguably exogenous with respect to the German economy (conditional on smooth un-
derlying changes): the Schism was a political event that did not coincide with any dramatic economic
shifts of which we are aware. In Table 2, we list several important economic changes that affected
Germany in the centuries surrounding the Papal Schism: important institutional innovations, discov-
eries of precious metals, and the massive demographic shock of the Black Death were all important
29Elsewhere in the Holy Roman Empire, the University of Vienna languished for nearly two decades until Henry of
Langenstein, “one of the strongest opponents of Clement at Paris,” arrived, became the “soul” of the university, and
attracted additional masters to the university (Rashdall, 1895, pp. 237–238).
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events that did not coincide with the Papal Schism.30 We thus focus on the period around the Schism
to identify universities’ contribution to Germany’s economic development; we argue that this natural
experiment can be used to credibly identify the causal effect of university establishment on economic
activity.31
[Table 2 about here]
3.3 Numbers and Provenance of German Students after the Schism
The newly-founded universities in Germany dramatically reduced the distance to, and the cost of
attending, a university for a large share of the population of the Holy Roman Empire. These changes
did not simply reallocate German students from universities abroad to universities at home—they
greatly expanded the number of Germans who were able to acquire some university training. Em-
phasizing the momentous effects that this change had on German society, Rashdall (1895, p. 214)
writes,
“The bulk of Germans at foreign universities [before the Schism] were probably young nobles
and well-born or well-beneficed ecclesiastics. . . . The career open to merit was [after the Schism]
brought within reach of sons of the tradesmen and the artisan. Martin Luther could have hardly
enjoyed a university education if he had had to go to Paris for it.”
Here we move beyond anecdotal evidence and document the increased supply of German uni-
versity students by presenting data on enrollments from the matriculation records of the first three
German universities, at Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt.32 We also collected information that allows
us to conservatively estimate the enrollments of German students at the Universities of Bologna,
Orle´ans, Padua, Paris, and Prague, which likely hosted the vast majority of Germans studying abroad,
thus allowing us to estimate the change in the number of Germans with some university training fol-
lowing the establishment of the new German universities.
30We further examine the impact of economic shocks, political shocks, and the possibility of effects of the Schism working
through channels other than university establishment, in Section 5.
31While the timing of the Papal Schism was arguably exogenous with respect to the development of the German econ-
omy, the location of universities established following the Schism certainly may have been correlated with other determi-
nants of economic activity. We examine this issue in detail below (see Section 5.2).
32A detailed description of the construction of student enrollment numbers and a full list of references is given in Ap-
pendix A. Less comprehensive data on German university student enrollments are presented in Coing (1964) and Garcı´a y
Garcı´a (1992). Their estimates are consistent with our arguments here.
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The data on student enrollment, presented in Figure 4, show a large increase in the number of
German university students following the establishment of the first three German universities. From
1366 to 1385, German student enrollment (all of which was necessarily abroad) averaged 170 students
per year. Between 1387 and 1406, the number of students in the three German universities alone
averaged 400 per year (and total enrollment of German students, in Germany or abroad, averaged 527
per year from 1387–1406). This rise in German student enrollments was almost immediate: between
1387 and 1396, the average was already over 360 students per year in the three German universities
(and around 470 German students per year including the foreign universities).
[Figure 4 about here]
The matriculation records generally provide information on the number of university students,
rather than university graduates. In fact, counting students (rather than graduates) more accurately
captures the impact of medieval universities on human capital: many university students in the
Middle Ages did not plan to graduate, yet acquired human capital and were employed in positions
where their education was put to use.33 However, as an alternative measure of human capital, we
also examine the change in the number of German university graduates after 1386, using the Reperto-
rium Academicum Germanicum (RAG) database, and find evidence of approximately a doubling in the
number of German university graduates from the 1366–1385 period to the 1387–1406 period (see the
online appendix, Section OA.3 for details). Thus, the data on both students and graduates indicate a
sharp increase in human capital in Germany after the first universities were established: thousands
of additional students, and hundreds of additional graduates between 1386 and 1406.
The large increase in German university students after 1386 is likely due to the smaller costs that
attending a German university entailed, as opposed to traveling to Bologna or Paris. Young men were
more likely to choose to attend a university if an educational institution was nearby. The historical
literature certainly supports this view; for example, Schwinges (2000, p. 38) writes that many of the
first university students “shared the common feature that the new university lay close their region of
origin.”34
33See Wieacker (1995, p. 119) and Cobban (1975, p. 224).
34Distance to a university continues to be an important determinant of human capital acquisition; see Card (1995).
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In fact, a closer analysis of the matriculation records reveals patterns consistent with this mech-
anism. The records of the University of Heidelberg (Toepke, 1884; analyzed in Fuchs, 1995) and of
Cologne (Keussen, 1892) indicate each student’s diocese of origin. In Figure 5, we present the cumula-
tive distribution functions of Heidelberg and Cologne students who enrolled between a university’s
foundation date and 1410, by the distance between a university and its students’ dioceses of origin.35
It is clear from the figure that the majority of students enrolled in both universities came from quite
nearby. Over 40% of the students enrolled at the University of Cologne came from the diocese of
Cologne itself. Around half of the Heidelberg students between 1386 and 1410 came from the three
dioceses surrounding Heidelberg: Speyer, Worms, and Mainz. The vast majority of the students en-
rolled prior to 1410 came from within 200 kilometers of their university. Finally, it is important to
add that historical evidence suggests that students returned to their hometowns to use their acquired
human capital; Wriedt (2000, p. 60) writes that most scholars who became urban officeholders “came
from the same city where they later worked, or from neighboring cities.”
[Figure 5 about here]
4 A Simple Model of University Foundation and Market Establishment
As a result of the Papal Schism, Germany was rapidly transformed from a land with no universities,
and relatively few students, into a land with several universities and many students. We present
a simple model that links university proximity, and thus human capital, to market establishment.
It generates an empirical model of market establishment that we estimate below, as well as clear
predictions regarding the effects of the Papal Schism and the subsequent establishment of Germany’s
first universities on economic activity.
Our assumption, supported by the empirical evidence in the previous section, is that medieval
universities increased human capital in areas in closer proximity to them. This human capital, in turn,
35We calculate the distances as great circle distances from the university to the seat of the diocese. Note that the city of
Heidelberg belonged to the diocese of Worms; from a closer analysis of the single entries in the matriculation records, we
determined that 40% (22 out of 55) of the students hailing from the diocese of Worms were actually natives of Heidelberg
itself. We therefore present disaggregated figures for the city of Heidelberg and the remainder of the diocese of Worms in
the top panel of Figure 5.
17
was important for supporting markets.36 We model market establishment in medieval Germany as
a function of (time-varying) underlying economic conditions, as well as human capital, hi,t, which
was time-varying and city-specific. Importantly, the demand for university training may have been
a function of economic conditions, too. To the extent that economic changes affected the demand for
human capital and market establishment smoothly over time, we can model these effects (and, in our
empirical work, control for them) using a simple time trend—at least within a fairly narrow window
of time.37 By controlling for smooth changes across time in the demand for universities, we can
identify the effect of the new universities coming from the exogenous supply shock resulting from
the Papal Schism. Thus, our focus is on studying market establishment within a relatively narrow
window of time around the establishment of Germany’s first universities.38
If we assume an additive, separable relationship between the time trend and human capital, we
can write the market establishment function as follows:
marketsi,t = α1 ·Yeart + γ · hi,t (1)
Human capital is a stock: it will depend on the cumulative effect of access to education in the past.
In medieval Germany, a crucial determinant of access to the human capital produced in universities
was the distance to the nearest university (as shown above). Thus, we model the human capital stock
in a city at any time as a (negative) linear function of the distance of that city to the nearest university
in n past years:
hi,t = −
n
∑
j=1
δt−j · distancei,t−j (2)
Prior to the Papal Schism and the establishment of the University of Heidelberg in 1386, German
students attended university abroad; there was a stable value of distancei,t−j, and so a stable level of
36In Section 6, below, we argue that training in newly-rediscovered Roman and canon law was especially useful. In the
current model, we do not make any specific assumption about what sort of human capital was useful, and argue only that
having a university in close proximity increased human capital, and thus the likelihood of establishing a market.
37We generally model the effects of changing economic conditions using a linear trend common to all cities; as a robust-
ness check, we also consider region-specific time trends in our empirical work (see Table 5).
38This makes the treatment effects estimated in the empirical section “local” in the sense that the effects of university
establishment are estimated conditional on particular economic conditions and demand for university training. We believe
these estimates are relevant: across Europe, university establishment occurred precisely when economic conditions were
ripe.
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human capital.39 After the foundation of the University of Heidelberg, cities experienced a reduction
in distance to a university. We define the following:
∆DistUnivi = distancei,pre − distancei,post,
where distancei,pre represents the pre-Schism minimum distance from city i to a university; we will
measure it in our empirical section as the minimum of the distance to the universities operating
as of 1385 (Bologna, Paris, Prague, etc.). The post-Schism distance to a university, distancei,post, is
computed as the minimum of distancei,pre and the distance to one of the newly founded German
universities in Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt. Thus, ∆DistUnivi is bounded from below by zero in
the case of all cities that, following the Schism, were no nearer to a university city than before.40
We define a post-university dummy variable, Postt, which equals 1 for all years after 1386, and a
linear time trend Yeart, normalized to be 0 in the “pivot year” of 1386.
41 As derived in Appendix B,
we obtain the following estimating equation:
marketsi,t = α0 + α1 ·Yeart + α2 · Postt + α3 ·Yeart · Postt + α4 · ∆DistUnivi
+α5 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart + α6 · ∆DistUnivi · Postt
+α7 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt + ε i,t (3)
Several terms on the right hand side are of special interest. First, the term on which we focus
our hypothesis testing is ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt: it will indicate whether cities with a larger reduc-
tion in distance to a university experienced a changed trend rate of market establishment after 1386.
If the Schism, and subsequent university establishment, led to the accumulation of human capital
over time, and this human capital supported market establishment, we would expect this term to be
positive and significant.
39This is, of course, only approximately true, and only a good approximation for n not too large.
40For all city-years it beginning in 1386, we treat distance to a university as the post-Schism distance. Treating different
cities (or years) differently as a function of the timing of the two other post-Schism university establishments (Cologne and
Erfurt) would raise concerns about endogeneity; hence, we calculate a single value of ∆DistUniv for each city i, applied to
all years, based on the three universities established between 1386 and 1392.
41The 8-year delay between the Schism itself and the foundation of the University of Heidelberg was due to the fact that
the expulsion of German academics from French universities did not occur before 1381–1384, and to the time needed to
grant a papal bull and set up a new institution of higher learning (Swanson, 1979, pp. 58–74).
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The Yeart · Postt term will indicate whether cities not experiencing any change in distance to a
university nonetheless experience a change in the trend rate of market establishment after 1386. This
term will have explanatory power if the Schism affected market establishment even where it did not
reduce distance to a university. If the Schism only affected market establishment rates through the
change in distance to a university, this term should not be statistically significant.
The ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart term also provides an important falsification test: it indicates whether cities
with a large change in distance to a university in 1386 had different trend rates of market establish-
ment even before any reduction in distance occurred. If ∆DistUnivi is uncorrelated with economic
conditions, then ∆DistUnivi · Yeart should not be statistically significant. In standard difference-in-
differences terminology, the term provides a test of parallel trends in the rate of market establishment
between cities that would and would not experience a change in distance to a university following
the Schism.
Next, the ∆DistUnivi · Postt term tells us if there was an immediate jump in market establishment
in 1386 in cities that experienced a reduction in distance to a university. Our hypothesized channel
of human capital accumulation affecting market establishment leads us to expect that term will not
be statistically significant. The ε it term will capture shocks to market establishment specific to a city-
year; in our empirical work we allow these shocks to be correlated across observations for each city.
In addition to looking at the city-level panel data, we will take a more macro-level view of market
establishment around the time of the establishment of the first German university. If we aggregate
market establishments across cities in equation (3), we can examine time series variation in market
establishment in all of Germany around 1386. Thus, we estimate:
marketst = β0 + β1 ·Yeart + β2 · Postt + β3 ·Yeart · Postt + ηt (4)
Equation (4) examines whether there is a change in the trend rate of market establishment in the
pivot year, 1386 (the coefficient on Yeart · Postt), and whether there is a discrete jump in the market
establishment rate (the coefficient on Postt) at that time. If university establishment affected human
capital accumulation, one would expect Yeart · Postt to be positive and significant. Moreover, one
would not expect Postt to be significantly different from zero, as this would imply an implausible,
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sudden effect on economic activity.42
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 University Foundation and Market Establishment in Germany
We begin our analysis by estimating the time-series equation (4) considering all of Germany from 20
years before through 20 years after 1386.43 The findings of Table 3, column 1, confirm the predictions
of our model: there is a positive break in the trend rate of market establishment, and no immediate
jump, in 1386. The predicted linear trends of market establishment pre- and post-1386 can be seen
in Figure 6.44 We also plot a locally-weighted smoothing (LOWESS) of the market establishment data
that does not impose any trend break in 1386. When we plot the smoothed market establishment rate
against the linear trend break model, one can see that the model is a remarkably good fit for the data
(see Figure 6).
[Table 3 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
The magnitude of the coefficient on Yeart · Postt, βˆ3, can be interpreted as 0.151 additional markets
per thousand cities for every additional year after 1386; this effect is large enough to reverse the neg-
ative pre-trend (coefficient on Yeart) of −0.061. The effect of this reversal in trends can be observed
in Figure 6, and suggests a change from 1.2 markets established per year, per thousand cities, in 1386
42Note, however, that we do expect the change in trend to occur immediately in 1386. This is consistent both with the
assumptions of our empirical model (i.e., a gradual increase in human capital), and with the high number of students
matriculated already in 1386 (see Figure 4), some of whom would have attended for only a short period of time, and then
entered the labor market, rather than studying until receiving a degree. In addition, some of the students enrolling in
Heidelberg or Cologne during the first years of these universities’ activity had begun their studies in universities outside
of Germany, and finished their studies in the new universities within a short period of time.
43The outcome variable in all of our regressions is the number of markets established per 1,000 cities, to facilitate compar-
isons of effects across specifications. In our time series specifications, we observe yearly market establishment data at the
region level in the raw data (the region may be all of Germany or subsets of it). We then multiply the number of markets
established by 1,000, and divide by the total number of cities in the region considered. In the panel data, we observe yearly
market establishment data at the city level in the raw data, and we multiply the value by 1,000 to convert the outcome into
“markets per 1,000 cities.”
44Figure 6 also shows that the change in trend after 1386 is not due to date heaping in the year 1400. In fact, Germany
witnessed fewer market granting episodes in 1400 (2) than in the years 1399 or 1401 (4 and 9, respectively).
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to just over 3 markets per year, per thousand cities, twenty years later. A back of the envelope cal-
culation suggests the establishment of around 40 additional markets between 1387 and 1406 relative
to the counterfactual in which market establishment had remained fixed at the 1386 level through
1406, and nearly 70 additional markets relative to the counterfactual in which market establishment
followed the pre-1386 trend for another 20 years. These are large effects: we find 102 total market es-
tablishments between 1387 and 1406, and our calculations suggest that a significant fraction of them
were a result of university establishment.45
We next wish to test for a link between reduced distance to a university and the change in the
trend rate of market establishment. As a first approach, we simply divide our sample into two
groups, based on the reduction in distance to the closest university, ∆DistUnivi. Equation (4) is then
estimated separately for the sample of cities whose change in distance is above the median change,
and the cities whose change is less than the median change. We expect a larger change in the trend
rate of market establishment in the sample of cities with large changes in distance to a university.
Indeed, in Table 3, columns 2 and 3, one can see that the coefficient on Yeart · Postt is positive and sig-
nificant for the sample of cities with a large (above median) change in distance to a university, but not
for regions with a small (below median) change in distance to a university. We plot the linear trends
for these two regions, pre- and post-1386, as well as the LOWESS smoothed market establishment
rates, in Figures 7 and 8.
[Figure 7 about here]
[Figure 8 about here]
To analyze the importance of the change in distance to a university using the entire sample of
cities, we now turn to the city-level panel data and estimate equation (3). As noted above, if improved
access to universities drove market establishment after 1386, one would expect to see a positive co-
efficient on the triple interaction term ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt. At the same time, we should not see
a statistically significant pre-1386 trend rate of market establishment in places with larger changes
in distance to a university (i.e., the coefficient on ∆DistUnivi · Yeart), nor should we see a significant
45We observe 102 total market establishments in 80 cities that received market grants in this period (some cities received
multiple grants). We discuss whether our proposed mechanism of legal training could account for an additional 40 (or 70)
markets below.
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change in the trend rate of market establishment in 1386 among cities with no change in distance to a
university (i.e., the coefficient on Yeart · Postt). In Table 3, column 4, these predictions are confirmed:
there is a significant, positive change in trend that is greater in cities experiencing a greater reduction
in distance to a university, but no differential trends across these areas before 1386.
Our baseline panel specification used city-year level data. A concern could be that this choice,
resulting in over 90,000 observations in our baseline specification, distorts our statistical inferences,
although standard errors are clustered at the city level. In addition, there might be general equilib-
rium effects of market establishment: a market in one city may replace (or simulate the creation of) a
market in another, meaning the units of observation might not have been independent. To gauge the
importance of the choice of city-year as the unit of analysis, we aggregate our data to larger units of
observation.
We first consider as our outcome variable the number of markets established in a territorial lord’s
land in each year (normalized as a rate per 1,000 cities).46 ∆DistUnivi is now calculated as the average
change in distance to a university across all cities in the relevant lord’s territory. Estimating equation
(3) using territory-year level, instead of city-year level, data does not affect our results, nor does
it affect our statistical inferences (see Table 3, column 5). Alternatively, we aggregate our market
establishment data to the level of 1-degree latitude by 1-degree longitude cells. Again, we find that
areas experiencing a larger reduction in distance to a university experienced a greater positive break
in the trend rate of market establishment after 1386 (see Table 3, column 6). In both of these alternative
datasets, we find no evidence of a differential pre-trend in areas with greater reductions in distance
to a university, nor do we find positive trend breaks in areas with no reduction in distance to a
university. In the following regression tables, we will present results based on city-year level data;
however, we replicate our panel regressions using territory-year and cell-year level data in the online
appendix (Tables OA.4 and OA.5).47
In the online appendix, Section OA.6, we consider variations on the time period studied (expand-
ing and contracting the window of analysis around 1386), and on the outcome variable (examining
46The Holy Roman Empire in the late Middle Ages was a complicated array of partly overlapping layers of sovereignty.
For each city in our dataset we coded the highest liege lord (other than the Emperor) to which it was subject around 1386.
47We also report our city-year regressions with standard errors clustered at the territory level in the online appendix
(Table OA.6).
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the sum of market establishment and city incorporations, or examining an indicator, rather than
count, of market establishment); in each case, we find evidence of a positive trend break in market
establishment in 1386, concentrated in areas experiencing a large change in distance to a university.
An important concern with the above regressions is that the timing of university establishment in
Germany following the Schism was possibly endogenous. In addition, our results in Table 3 might
simply be capturing changes in trends that began before university establishment and that were more
pronounced in areas that happened to experience reductions in distance to a university following the
Papal Schism.
To evaluate the likelihood of either of these possibilities, we check whether alternative pivot years
generate results similar to those above. These alternative pivot years can be thought of as placebo
tests: we expect to see trend breaks (in the time series specification) and a significant triple interaction
term ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt for pivot years around 1386, but not for other pivot years.
We thus estimate equation (4) 21 times on the full sample of cities; and we estimate equation (3)
21 times on the full city-year panel. In a series of regressions, we use a 40-year window around every
year between 1376 and 1396, changing the definition of Postt accordingly. We plot the coefficients on
Yeart · Postt or ∆DistUnivi · Yeart · Postt, respectively, from these regressions, along with their 95%
confidence intervals, in Figures 9 and 10.48 One can see that the largest, most significant trend breaks
occur very close to 1386. Ten years before Germany’s first university was established, market estab-
lishment rates were not experiencing any sharp break in trend, as evidenced by the point estimate
being close to 0. Analogously, after 1386 there is progressively less evidence of a change in trend.
The sharp change in the trend rate of market establishment is quite specific to the time of university
establishment in Germany.
[Figure 9 about here]
[Figure 10 about here]
48The online appendix reports graphs analogous to Figure 9 for the two subsamples of cities with above and below
median changes in distance to a university (Figures OA.2 and OA.3).
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5.2 Endogeneity of University Location
The results above reveal a positive break in the trend in market establishment in 1386—when Ger-
many’s first university was established—and that this break in trend was most evident in areas that
experienced the greatest reduction in the distance to a university during the Papal Schism. However,
one might be concerned about the possibility that the location of universities, and thus ∆DistUnivi,
was correlated with an unobserved variable that also stimulated economic activity around the time
of the Schism. For example, the results in Table 3 might have been due to a correlation between
good leadership, or good local economic conditions, and university foundation. That is, a territorial
lord may have founded a university, then founded many markets nearby; a prescient lord may have
founded a university in anticipation of good economic times ahead. Alternatively, a positive local
economic shock, leading to a surplus of agricultural goods, might have increased the demand for a
university and also market establishment in close proximity.
These alternative stories would explain a sharp change in market establishment rates precisely
when universities were founded, and near those universities.49 To examine the possibility that our
results in Table 3 were the result of endogenous university locations in response to local economic
conditions, we estimate our baseline specifications on alternative samples of German cities: first, we
exclude cities within 20 km of a university, then those within 50 km of a university. Next, using in-
formation on local territorial lords collected for each of our cities from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, we
exclude from our analysis the three lords’ territories containing a university city: these are the Rhen-
ish Palatinate (Heidelberg), the Archbishopric of Cologne (Cologne), and the Archbishopric of Mainz
(Erfurt).50 Note that dropping these territories also addresses concerns about political favoritism
(perhaps resulting from the Schism or some other political conflict) toward particular lords leading
to university establishment and market grants in the same regions.51
49Note that the results in Table 3 do not refer directly to the proximity of universities, but rather the change in proximity:
the correlation between the change in distance to a university (as a result of the Schism) and the actual distance to the
newly founded universities is −0.678.
50In fact, the University of Cologne was established by the citizens of the (free) city of Cologne, rather than by the
Archbishop. Still, we exclude the territory of the Archbishop to treat the three universities uniformly.
51All of the analyses in which we drop particular, potentially problematic, observations can also be conducted by allow-
ing the sub-groups of concern to be treated as categories experiencing their own pre-Schism trend rate of market establish-
ment as well their own post-Schism trend break (along with all lower-order terms). We present these analyses in the online
appendix, Section OA.7, and the conclusions drawn are the same as those from the estimates presented in the main text.
25
In Table 4, columns 1, 3, and 5 one can see that there is a positive break in the trend rate of market
establishment in 1386 even when we exclude cities within 20 km or 50 km of a university, or when
we exclude cities in the same territory as a university.52 The role played by the reduction in distance
to a university can be seen in the corresponding panel data specifications of Table 4, columns 2,
4, and 6: there is a positive and significant break in the trend rate of market establishment that is
greater for cities with a larger change in distance to a university (see the coefficient on ∆DistUnivi ·
Yeart · Postt). This differential trend break was not entirely driven by cities extremely close to the
universities themselves or by cities belonging to the lords whose territories contained the universities.
Importantly, we do not see any differential pre-1386 trend associated with ∆DistUnivi, and we see no
effect of the Schism on post-1386 market establishment in cities experiencing no change in distance
to a university.
[Table 4 about here]
Another concern about the location of the new universities is that cities with high values of
∆DistUnivi are generally concentrated in Western Germany, close to the Rhine and near the eco-
nomically vibrant Low Countries. Additionally, scholars have identified important institutional dif-
ferences between Germany east and west of the Elbe following the Black Death of 1348 (e.g., Brenner,
1976; Dittmar, 2009). More generally, given the clear association between longitude and the change
in distance to a university seen in Figure 2, one wants to be sure that our results are not driven simply
by our comparison of late 14th-century economic activity across regions of Germany that differed in
ways other than the change in distance to a university post-1386.
It is important, however, to point out that underlying differences across German regions that
were associated with the post-1386 change in distance to a university would much more likely pro-
duce either a level difference in market establishment across regions (e.g., ∆DistUnivi having a pos-
itive coefficient), or a different trend in market establishment, which would show up pre-1386 (i.e.,
∆DistUnivi · Yeart having a positive coefficient). It would be much more difficult to explain why
there would be a positive break in the trend rate of market establishment precisely in 1386, associated
52The online appendix reports additional results from estimating our time series specification separately for the samples
of cities with above-median and below-median ∆DistUnivi, for each time series specification discussed here and in sections
below (Table OA.7). In every case (including specifications discussed below), our inferences from splitting the sample and
using the time-series specification are consistent with those from estimating the panel specification.
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with ∆DistUnivi. Consider, for example, the Black Death, which certainly might have generated dif-
ferent trends in economic activity across Germany post-1348.53 In principle, these different trends
may even have been correlated with ∆DistUnivi, as the Western part of Germany may have been
especially economically vibrant post-plague (that is, post-1348). However, we find no significant
differences in levels or trend rates of market activity associated with ∆DistUnivi prior to 1386 (see
Table 3). One might believe that the Black Death generated effects that accelerated across time; how-
ever, our findings in Figures 9 and 10 show that there was no sign of any trend break in economic
activity in general or associated with ∆DistUnivi prior to the mid-1380s.
One still might worry about the effects of time-varying economic shocks that are region-specific.
To address concerns regarding regional differences across Germany driving our results, we begin by
testing for a break in the trend rate of market establishment only on the sample of cities farther than
20 km from the Rhine. If cities near the Rhine experienced differential trends (or trend breaks) in
economic activity, for example, because of their proximity to the Low Countries, we would not want
this to drive our results. In Table 5, column 1, we present the results from estimating the specification
in Table 3, column 1, but excluding cities near the Rhine. We continue to find a significant break
in the trend. In Table 5, column 2, one can see that this break is again greater in cities with greater
reductions in distance to a university.
Next, we address concerns that our results are driven by differential trends east versus west of
the Elbe in the late 14th century. In Table 5, columns 3 and 4, we estimate our baseline specifications
only for cities that are West of the Elbe; even in this restricted subsample, we continue to find very
similar results.
Another way to determine whether diverging trends in market establishment in east versus west
Germany are behind our results is to explicitly allow the pre-1386 and post-1386 trend rates of market
establishment to vary with longitude. If trend breaks specific to eastern Germany drive our results,
rather than the change in distance to a university, then controlling for longitude-varying trend breaks
post-1386 should eliminate the trend break associated with the change in distance to a university. We
thus estimate the specification in Table 3, column 4, but include Longitudei ·Yeart · Postt and all lower-
53Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012, 2013) show that the arrival of the Black Death had monumental consequences, resulting
in changed incomes and urbanization, and also changing the composition of society through anti-Jewish pogroms.
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order interactions and terms as controls. We find that the longitude-varying trend break post-1386
is not statistically significant, and the coefficient on ∆DistUnivi · Yeart · Postt remains positive and
statistically significant, and similar in magnitude to our baseline estimate (see Table 5, column 5).54
Finally, we consider a specification that adds to our baseline specification state-specific time
trends, as well as state-specific trend breaks in 1386 (that is, interaction terms of Yeart, Postt, and
Yeart · Postt with state dummies). We adopt the division of Germany into 18 states as in the volumes
of the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.55 This specification allows each state to follow its own pre-1386 trend
rate of market establishment, and also allows each state to experience its own trend break in 1386 (as
well as its own discrete “jump” in market establishment in 1386). In this setup, the effect of a change
in university distance on market establishments is estimated only from the within-state variation of
∆DistUnivi. As can be seen in Table 5, column 6, our results from this specification are quite similar
to our baseline: we continue to see a significant, positive coefficient on ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt.
[Table 5 about here]
5.3 The Impact of Political Shocks on Market Establishment
While the findings above suggest that differential economic shocks across regions of Germany (other
than the new universities) likely did not drive our results, one might still be concerned that the many
political changes occurring in Germany in the late 14th century may have affected market establish-
ment. For example, changes in a city’s territorial lord—which were somewhat common in the period
we study—may have resulted in new lords’ formalizing existing markets under their own authority
for symbolic purposes or to extract rents. We examine each case of a market establishment between
1386 and 1406 to determine whether there was a jurisdictional change within the 10 years prior to the
market establishment (information on changes in jurisdiction comes from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch).
54Note that the negative coefficient on ∆DistUnivi · Postt is offset by the coefficient on Longitudei · Postt (not shown).
Also, when the longitude-varying trend break is estimated alone, it is significant and negative, indicating that western parts
of Germany, indeed, experienced a positive trend break, relative to the east (as one would have expected from Figure 2).
However, the effect disappears once one accounts for the effects of ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt.
55These are Bavaria, Baden, Wu¨rttemberg, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Rhineland, Westphalia, Lower Saxony
(including Bremen), Schleswig-Holstein (including Hamburg), Saxony, Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg (including
Berlin), Mecklenburg, Silesia, and Pomerania (for the vast majority of cases, these states correspond to present-day La¨nder
in the Federal Republic of Germany). A map showing these 18 states, and the locations of cities within them, is presented
in the online appendix, Figure OA.4.
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We identified 7 cities with a recent jurisdictional change, and we estimate the specifications in Table 3,
columns 1 and 4, after dropping these cities. Although we drop over 5% of the markets established
in the post-1386 period from our analysis, we continue to find a significant, positive trend break in
market establishment concentrated in cities experiencing a larger change in distance to a university
(see Table 6, columns 1 and 2).
Another potential confounding factor is inter-city conflict, which was also common in the 14th
century. During the period we study, Swabia in particular was a site of conflict, with a coalition of
cities fighting wars against neighboring territorial lords (Moraw, 1989; Schuler, 1977–1999). Conflict
among cities may have resulted in the use of lawyers to redirect trade, rather than increase it; market
rights could have been used in economic warfare to increase tax revenues or to hurt the markets
of competing cities. To determine whether market rights granted in regions of conflict played an
important role in generating our results, we estimate the specifications in Table 3, columns 1 and 4,
using the sample of cities excluding the state of Wu¨rttemberg, which includes Swabia. We continue
to find results similar to our baseline specifications (see Table 6, columns 3 and 4). Thus, the region in
which inter-city conflict would have made lawyers and lords most likely to use market grants purely
for strategic, political reasons does not drive our findings.
We next ask whether some effect of the Papal Schism other than university establishment was
likely to have changed economic activity and caused some part of the trend break in market establish-
ment we observe in 1386.56 For example, the Schism may have affected trade patterns; shifts in papal
politics may have had broader impacts on economic and social life. One important concern is that
the Papal Schism resulted in a small number of cities in the Holy Roman Empire aligning themselves
with the Pope in Avignon, rather than Rome.57 The resulting political fragmentation may have had
economic consequences that were differential across German territories depending on which Pope a
territory recognized. Since cities aligned with Avignon had higher values of ∆DistUnivi, this might
drive some of the trend break that we find.58 To examine whether the market establishment pat-
56Note that to account for the changes in market establishment we observe, these other, unobserved economic effects
would have had to be correlated with the reduction in distance to a university.
57The territorial lords who, for some period of time, aligned themselves with Clement, the Pope in Avignon, were the
princes of Austria (Habsburg), Brabant, Cleves, East Frisia, Gleichen, Hoya, Katzenelnbogen, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Mark,
Nassau, Saarbru¨cken, Schwarzburg and Waldeck, as well as the prince-bishops of Mainz and Strasbourg (Hauck, 1953,
pp. 698–716).
58The correlation between an indicator that a city was loyal to Avignon and ∆DistUnivi is 0.259.
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terns we observe were driven by the cities loyal to Avignon, we estimate the specifications in Table 3,
columns 1 and 4, after dropping the 223 cities loyal to the Avignon Pope. We find that our results are
very similar to those in our baseline estimates (see Table 6, columns 5 and 6).59
[Table 6 about here]
We also undertake falsification exercises that can shed light on effects of the Schism on economic
activity through channels other than university establishment: we examine market establishment
trends in England/Wales and Italy, which were exposed to the Papal Schism, but which experienced
no significant changes in the number of universities in the baseline period we study.60 If England or
Italy experienced changes in market establishment rates in 1386, one would suspect that there were
consequences of the Schism for economic activity that worked through channels other than university
establishment.
Because we lack any cross-sectional variation in Italy and England analogous to ∆DistUnivi in
Germany, we simply run placebo tests for breaks in the trend rate of market establishment in these re-
gions in 1386 using the time series model of equation (4).61 The results presented in Table 7, columns 1
and 2, indicate that there was no change in the level or trend of the rate of market establishment in
Italy or England in 1386. The Schism did not affect market establishment rates in places that did
not experience increased university establishment as a result. This evidence strongly points to in-
creased access to universities as the causal factor explaining increased rates of market establishment
in Germany after 1386.
[Table 7 about here]
59In the online appendix, we also discuss the possibility that political shocks outside of Germany may have had spillover
effects, affecting patterns of German trade, and thus market establishment (see the online appendix, Table OA.12).
60The market establishment data we were able to collect for Italy are for Naples, Sicily, and Lombardy, and come from
Mira (1955), Grohmann (1969), and Epstein (1992). The English and Welsh market data were collected by Keene and Letters
(2004).
61Results are very similar if we use 1378, the year of the Schism itself, as the pivot year; these regressions are reported in
the online appendix (see the online appendix, Table OA.13).
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6 University Training and the Development of Legal Institutions
6.1 The Importance of Legal Institutions in Medieval Europe
How might the establishment of Germany’s first universities have promoted the expansion of eco-
nomic activity? There are several plausible, non-exclusive mechanisms that may have been at work.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, university training in the liberal arts provided skills in mathematics,
rhetoric, and logic that may have been useful in business and trade; the formation of social networks
of skilled individuals, too, might have supported exchange.62 We argue that training in Roman and
canon law, and the consequent development of legal institutions likely represented a particularly
important channel through which universities affected economic activity.
Europe’s Commercial Revolution occurred just as Roman law was reestablished in Europe.63 The
Justinian Code, “rediscovered” in the eleventh century, provided the foundation for a legal system
that could enforce contracts and define the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. The Code
became the core curriculum at Europe’s first university, in Bologna, and over the centuries it formed
the basis of the civil law curriculum in universities throughout Europe. Doctors of law at the univer-
sities wrote glosses on (interpretations of) the Code and lectured on these; as their students spread
throughout Europe, taking positions of influence, the legal system in which they were trained spread,
too.64
Roman law represented a significant improvement over the pre-existing systems of customary
law. Whereas customary law was very local, Roman law was universally known across Europe;
whereas customary law was highly traditional, based on kinship and superstition, Roman law was
an authoritative yet flexible system that had been enriched by centuries of scholarship; whereas
traditional law was informal and feuds were often preferred to trial, Roman law was written—
62Universities may have also increased commercial activity by directly increasing demand for goods and services, or by
generating agglomeration economies. Our findings of significant effects of university establishment more than 50 kilome-
ters away from the university cities themselves suggest, however, that these mechanisms do not play a predominant role
in driving our findings.
63We join legal scholars in attaching preeminent importance to the rediscovery of the Justinian code, as opposed to other
codifications of that epoch, such as the Sachsenspiegel. We discuss how training in Roman law represented new, valuable
human capital in medieval Europe in Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013).
64Cobban (1975, p. 220) writes that, “The products of Europe’s law universities . . . were readily absorbed into royal,
imperial, or papal service as counsellors [and] as judges. . . . By means of this graduate recruitment, the principles of
Roman and canon law permeated the governmental structures of Europe. In this sense, the law universities were agencies
of cardinal importance in shaping the very texture of, and juristic principles underlying, European political organization.”
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contributing to the increasing importance of written evidence in the Middle Ages65—and based on a
process of rational pursuit of truth (Berman, 1983). Broadly-applied, rule-based, written laws effec-
tively reduced the uncertainty merchants faced in economic transactions. In the particular context of
Germany, with its highly fractionalized territories, these advantages of Roman law were particularly
salient.66
Though our primary focus is on Roman law, the importance of canon law in many spheres of pub-
lic life in medieval times should not be neglected. Training in canon law, like Roman law, occurred in
the medieval universities; indeed, most students studying law in medieval universities studied both
canon and Roman law—utrumque ius (both laws), as it was commonly expressed. Because contracts
relied on promises and sworn oaths, the Church played a role in contract enforcement, even when
the parties to the contract were not clerics.67 As pointed out by Berman (1983, p. 250), “the canonists
were able, with the help of Romanist legal science, to create a subsystem of contract law within the
system of canon law as a whole.”
The increasing numbers of legally-trained administrators and the application of Roman and canon
law across all spheres of public life could have had a series of positive effects on economic develop-
ment. The legal historian Harold Berman argues that the rediscovery of Roman law, and the increas-
ing development and sophistication of European legal systems (canon, Roman, and merchant law),
fundamentally shaped the development of Europe’s states, by bringing a new approach to the resolu-
tion of conflicts among various lords, secular and religious (Berman, 1983). Conflicts between secular
and religious authorities had plagued Europe during the better part of the Middle Ages; disputes ex-
isted among various secular jurisdictions as well (e.g., cities, or feudal lords). Moraw (1989, p. 639)
writes that economic success for cities in the Middle Ages “was a matter of urban ‘foreign policy’”;
cities needed to establish their legal rights in a context of “multiplicity and lack of clarity of seignio-
65See Mostert, ed (1992) on this process, known as Verschriftlichung/verschriftelijking. On the written component of canon
law, see Coing (1964, p. 79), and on the increasing use of written records in city and maritime courts, see Berman (1983,
p. 355).
66Wieacker (1995, pp. 78–84). See also Stobbe (1860, p. 637) and Savigny (1834, vol. 3, p. 84).
67The Church’s competence in cases which would today be regarded as purely belonging to secular law was substantial.
Church tribunals dealt with causae saeculares in the following cases: ratione peccati, i.e., cases in which the subject matter
was considered a sin and hence had to be confessed to a priest; privilegium fori, i.e., the participation of a cleric as a plaintiff
or defendant, or other special categories, such as Jews and sometimes even university students; and denuntiatio evangelica,
i.e., the evident necessity to apply moral or theological reasoning (Wieacker, 1995, pp. 51–53). Moreover, cases were often
brought to the attention of ecclesiastical tribunals even if they did not strictly belong to their field of competence because
of their perceived independence and better ability to enforce sanctions (Kroeschell, 1973, p. 23).
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rial rights.” Resolving these competing claims ultimately served to support and stabilize the process
of state formation. Stronger polities, with effective administrators, and in which multiple layers of
sovereignty were simplified and overlapping entitlements solved, found it easier to establish courts,
organize economic activity and establish markets.
The development of courts of law is another indicator of how Roman law permeated the pub-
lic sphere in Europe. Stein (1999, p. 86) writes that “states in continental Europe gloried in their
new found ‘sovereignty’, and set up professional courts . . . [that] uniformly adopted a variant of
the Romano-canonical procedure.” For example, in the economically vibrant Low Countries, courts
played an important role in resolving (often international) commercial disputes in the in the middle
of the 14th century (Gelderblom, 2005, 2011; Dijkman, 2011). The spread of Roman legal thinking
to courts across Europe, and across Germany’s fragmented territories, made adjudication over com-
mercial disputes much more predictable. As judges increasingly became trained following a common
curriculum of studies, and were thus expected to follow those principles when passing judgments,
contracting was made easier in the expectation of more certain procedures of adjudication and dis-
pute resolution. Greater access to information about these rules may have been important, too: judges
relying on written law were more predictable than judges relying on unwritten principles.
These mechanisms were very much at work in the specific case of Germany. The granting of
formal market rights in Germany required the establishment of a market court. In traditional courts
based on customary law, “[j]udgments were taken by the ‘Ding’, which often met only four times a
year. The procedural rules were very time-consuming. . . . The law was of an agricultural, Germanic
origin and not at all suited for the needs of efficient trade by mobile traders” (Bindseil and Pfeil,
1999, p. 741); in contrast, market courts based on modern, Roman law could act much more swiftly,
issuing rulings that were meaningful across jurisdictions. The late medieval market courts were
economically consequential: Bindseil and Pfeil (1999, p. 750) write, “As one of the crucial elements of
a medieval market consisted in the establishment of a market law and a market court, investment to
set up these institutions had to be undertaken. This required preparatory work by lawyers, training
of the market overseers and legal documentation. The ability of the market court and administration
was certainly a major element in the assessment of the market quality by the users of the market.”
Finally, legislation and the evolution of contractual norms led to the adoption of Roman con-
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tract law across Europe. Berman (1983, p. 245) writes that Roman law “had achieved a very high
level of sophistication in the field of contracts, and . . . could be applied in the twelfth century to the
newly burgeoning commercial life in Western Europe.” Stein (1999, p. 66) notes that in a French trea-
tise, written by Philippe de Beaumanoir around 1280, “the section on contracts, a subject that was
not highly developed in local customs, drew considerably on Roman sources.”68 The Roman law
“toolkit” became even easier to apply as it spread and gained acceptance in the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries. Uniform contractual norms across polities served as a coordination device (Postema,
1982; McAdams, 2000), and reduced the uncertainty of exchange.
For all of these reasons—more clearly defined state institutions and jurisdictions, more predictable
adjudication, and greater uniformity of legal contracts—a better-developed formal legal system should
have reduced the uncertainty and risk associated with trade in the Middle Ages and increased com-
mercial exchange. Greater merchant activity in a more predictable environment, and the improved
administrative capacity of territorial lords would have jointly provided stronger incentives for the
creation of new markets.
6.2 The Training and Careers of Jurists in the German Lands
Legal Study in Germany
To support our proposed mechanism of legal institutions linking the first German universities to
increased market establishment, it is important to determine how many of the students enrolled
in the first German universities studied law, what their careers were, and whether their numbers
and influence could plausibly explain the increase in the number of markets established between
1386 and 1406. We begin by presenting data on the numbers of law students in Germany’s first
three universities. Among the more than 2,000 students matriculated at the University of Cologne
between 1389 and 1410, we find that nearly a quarter (24%) studied law.69 Unfortunately, we do
not have data on the number of Heidelberg students studying law; however, Fuchs (1995, Table II)
68Vinogradoff (1929, p. 138, 143–144) writes that in the Middle Ages “it became more and more usual for parties to a suit
to submit the points in dispute to the arbitration of doctors of law,” and that the influence of Roman law was “especially
manifest in the law of contracts.”
69The records show 2,380 students matriculating between 1389 and 1410. Of these, 352 students (all students who ma-
triculated between 1391 and 1395) have missing data on the faculty in which they studied. Of the remaining 2,028 students,
482 studied law (Keussen, 1892).
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shows that 14% of Heidelberg graduates before 1450 were in law; this is slightly above the fraction
of Cologne graduates in law—which was 13% over the same period.70 While we also lack precise
numbers for Erfurt, we believe that the fraction of students studying law was likely significant there
as well: Coing (1964, p. 66) estimates that more students graduated in law from Erfurt than from
Cologne or Heidelberg over the period 1386–1540, and Walther (2000, p. 116) notes that “the Erfurt
law faculty attracted clerks not only from Franconia and the German Midlands, but also from the
northern German cities and towns of the Hanseatic League.” If we assume that of the 400 students
enrolled in the three universities each year between 1387 and 1406, 20% were studying law, this
would amount to 80 law students per year at the first German universities across their first 20 years.
The Repertorium Academicum Germanicum provides evidence on the number of German law graduates,
which more than tripled from the 1366–1385 period to the 1387–1406 period (an increase by 150
individuals).71
It is important to note that unlike training in the arts, which could be acquired to some extent at
cathedral schools or other studia, university training in law did not have close substitutes in medieval
Germany: Wieacker (1995, p. 114) writes that “no comparable education in the studium civile was
available in Germany.” Clark (1987, p. 653) writes that “[t]he study of law in continental Europe has
been associated for centuries with instruction at the university. To a significant extent this defines
the salient characteristic of the civil law tradition” (emphasis in the original). Thus, the increased
university training in law does not reflect a reallocation of students to universities from other sites
of legal training; increased legal training in Germany was made possible by the establishment of the
new universities.
The Careers of Jurists in the German Lands
The development of states with trained administrators, the clarification of lords’ and cities’ jurisdic-
tions, the development of formal courts, and the reduction of uncertainty in commercial exchange
were all driven forward by individuals trained in law in the first German universities. Here we
present historical evidence on their careers.
70Law represents a smaller fraction of graduates than of students, because (relative to the bachelor of arts degree) it was
an advanced degree, and because legal studies for even a short course provided valuable skills.
71See online appendix, Section OA.3, for details on these estimates.
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Historians have long drawn clear links between university training and careers in secular and
Church administrations. University graduates in law often worked in exalted positions, serving on
courts, and as counselors to cities, lords, and bishops.72 This was the product of a recruitment strategy
of territorial lords and city councilors, who valued the legal training that the universities provided—
a recruitment strategy which was certainly active in 15th century Germany. Walther (2000, p. 124)
writes, “Since they had founded the University at Heidelberg, the Palatine Electors systematically
undertook to tie all law doctors of their university to themselves . . . Thus, they secured the expertise
of these ‘learned counsellors’ for their own good use. In the same way, Imperial cities not only came
to realize that employing ‘learned counsellors’ as lawyers (syndici) or consultants was useful. In fact,
especially in [the mid-15th century] it was indispensable if municipal liberties and franchises were to
be defended by judicial means.”
University-trained lawyers—graduates and non-graduates—played a variety of important roles
in city and territory administration and in protecting their polities’ rights. In the economically-
vibrant Hanseatic League cities, “[s]ince the middle of the fifteenth century, holding a doctorate in
law was common among [the] syndics [i.e., administrators], some of them being prominent scholars
of their time. . . . More intensive than other cities, Nuremberg bound jurists in the fifteenth century
and employed them as counsels of the [city] council, so that five or more of them were working at the
same time” (Schwinges, 2000, p. 57). In cities such as Mu¨hlhausen, Erfurt, Augsburg, Bern, and Stras-
bourg, individuals trained in law worked for the city chancellery, advising on laws and regulations,
and working as diplomats who could protect a city’s rights in jurisdictional disputes (Schwinges,
2000, pp. 57–58).
In addition to individuals working within the city chancellery, Schwinges (2000, p. 58) notes the
importance of “procurators and syndics . . . employed to represent the town in cases and at court.”73 It
72Some of the legally-trained (generally doctors of law) were also able to pursue careers at the highest levels of govern-
ment. Moraw (1986, p. 143) finds that the central administration of the Holy Roman Empire was a substantial employer
of university graduates trained in the law: between 1273 and 1493, at least 230 jurists served in the Imperial Court. Most
of these served in the century following the establishment of the first universities in Germany, both in an administrative
capacity and in a judicial court, the Reichskammergericht. Garcı´a y Garcı´a (1992) writes, “[L]aw graduates, both clerics and
laymen, held official posts with various authorities, from the imperial and royal chanceries downwards. Both in the church
and in civilian employment men of law held economic as well as administrative posts.” See also Vinogradoff (1929, p 133),
Coing (1964, §26), Moraw (1992, p. 273), and Wieacker (1995, pp. 65–67).
73On jurists serving cities and territories in Germany, and influencing their jurisdiction as well as their economic policy,
see also Dotzauer (1977) and Nicholas (1977, pp. 156–159). One example of a specific policy implemented by administrators
to support trade was the creation of brokerage regulations. Boerner and Quint (2010) argue that these medieval regula-
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is important to emphasize that non-graduates served in the same positions as graduates—positions
as chroniclers, notaries or procurators—but often in the smaller cities and towns. Wieacker (1995,
p. 119) writes of German law students: “Those who for social or economic reasons did not become
doctors or complete the full law course could still have a sense of belonging to a respected profession,
and suitable positions . . . were open to them in smaller principalities and cities [for example, posts]
as court secretary, city secretary, or agent . . . This group probably had more effect than any other on
the day-to-day progress of [Roman law in Germany].”74
Some data on the careers of medieval university students are available, which indicate their im-
portant role in manning Germany’s secular and Church administrations in a slightly later time pe-
riod. Kuhn (1971) collected information on 1,627 students from Tu¨bingen University from the years
1477 to 1534. Around 20 percent of students in Kuhn’s sample served in public administration jobs,
not including individuals serving in administrative positions within the Church. In the sub-sample of
students who attended both Tu¨bingen and Bologna—these were overwhelmingly students of law—
an even larger fraction of students, around 30 percent, pursued public administration careers, and
again, an additional significant share may have been administrators within the Church.75
Beyond administration, the legally-trained played a crucial role in advocating on behalf of parties
to disputes, and to adjudicating those disputes. In fact, many of the jurists employed by cities or
territorial lords, discussed above, were involved in dispute resolution—one of the first activities of
jurists working for both secular and ecclesiastic administrations of the Empire was as arbitrators, ad-
judicating disputes between cities, territories, and the Church.76 Over the course of the 15th century,
tions governing commercial transactions were successful in solving incentive and allocation problems, and increasing the
welfare of a city’s population.
74Cobban (1975, p. 224) writes of England: “From the beginning of the reign of Henry III there were at Oxford a number
of teachers who specialized in the ‘useful’ subjects which had a direct application to the practical problems of business
administration. . . . Probably many of the youthful students who attended these practical courses had never at any time
intended a university degree, but had come to take a rapid course in business administration to qualify for a modest post.”
75In Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013), we present data from Kuhn (1971) and also consider the careers of 1,212 law graduates
from the University of Bologna (of all nationalities), from 1070 through 1619, as recorded by Alidosi (1623). We find that 21
percent of the Bologna graduates pursued careers in public administration, and another 31 percent pursued administrative
careers in the Church.
76Thanks to the large number of legally trained individuals following the establishment of the first German universities,
characteristic elements of Roman law entered the political, judicial and commercial spheres even before the formal adoption
of Roman law in the Holy Roman Empire, a process is known as Fru¨hrezeption (early reception); see Trusen (1962), Coing
(1964), and Wieacker (1995). It is interesting to observe that in nearby Austria, where Roman law was not taught, it did
not enter the public sphere either. The university of Vienna taught only Canon law during the whole 15th century; as a
consequence, the use of Roman law in the administration of the Austrian territories diffused only much later, in the 16th
and 17th centuries (Baltl, 1962, pp. 64–70).
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individuals trained in the law served on regular courts in addition to resolving arbitration cases.
In addition to supporting markets by resolving disputes among territories and clarifying juris-
diction, the influence of jurists on the establishment and success of markets was often more direct,
as individuals with legal training often adjudicated commercial disputes, or represented the dis-
putants. Professional jurists increasingly sat on the market courts; the same was true for private lay
courts (Scho¨ffenstu¨hle) and arbitration courts (Schiedsgerichte), where legally trained individuals could
be active as arbitrators, assessors, or procurators who helped to resolve private disputes (Berman,
1983, p. 346; Wieacker, 1995, p. 119; Coing, 1964, p. 90).
The work of legally-trained judges and advocates was complemented by individuals with legal
training serving in other positions. Public notaries, who were often linked to the Church, played an
important role in securing formal property rights (Wieacker, 1995, pp. 85–86). The Church was also
very active in the authentication of documents: for example, around the middle of the 15th century
the ecclesiastical tribunal of Strasbourg was authenticating about 300–600 documents per week (Co-
ing, 1964, §25; Trusen, 1962, p. 66). Notarized contracts, authenticated documents, and written rules
made legal institutions more effective and reduced the uncertainty of economic transactions.
The career of Dietrich von Bocksdorf, who studied at the universities of Leipzig and Perugia,
then was a professor of law in Leipzig, provides an indication of the range of disputes resolved by
German jurists in the mid-15th century—many of which were commercial in nature. Bocksdorf was
often involved in the resolution of disputes over debt, and conflicts among townspeople, cities, and
lords, over trade and jurisdiction. For example, in 1456 Bocksdorf defended the merchant Niklaus
Mu¨ller, who was accused of not honoring a note of 1200 guilders, contracted on a yearly fair with an-
other merchant, Heinrich Greifvogel (though most disputes involved smaller sums, 50–200 guilders).
Bocksdorf drafted hundreds of expert opinions on behalf of princes, the nobility, and bishops; but,
he also drafted opinions for rural communities and peasants, for townspeople and for the cities in
which they lived. One of these involved the resolution of a classic conflict over negative production
externalities: a group of fishermen on a river in Saxony sued the owners of a foundry further up on
the river, which, they claimed, polluted the river with metal pieces (Wejwoda, 2012). The resolution
of economic disputes by people like Bocksdorf affected very broad swathes of society in the 15th
century.
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Several other exemplary careers of jurists trained in Roman law can be found, though the his-
torical record is skewed towards those engaged in affairs of state. Winand von Steeg studied at the
University of Heidelberg from 1394 until 1401. His various occupations included teaching law in
Wu¨rzburg, working as a canon, and serving as an envoy of the city of Nuremberg to the Council of
Constance (1414–1418), which resolved the Papal Schism. Steeg was also involved in resolving eco-
nomic disputes: he acted as an arbitrator in a dispute about custom payments for transit shipments
on the Rhine, and was asked to deliver expert testimony on the legality of the purchase of rents
(Repertorium Academicum Germanicum, 2013). Muther (1876, pp. 26–29) describes the activities of
Arnold Westphal: he taught law in Erfurt, Leipzig, and Rostock, was nominated bishop of Lu¨beck,
wrote legal treatises, was asked for his legal advice by the rulers of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark,
and arbitrated in Prussia. While these career paths are clearly outstanding, they are indicative of the
variety of activities that trained jurists of the 14th and 15th century could have engaged in.
University training in the law was thus closely linked to occupations that increased the supply
of markets and the demand for them: legally-trained administrators and judges reduced the cost of
establishing markets for cities and territories; more predictable adjudication reduced the uncertainty
of contracting and engaging in commercial activity in medieval Germany, increasing merchants’ de-
mand for markets.
In our empirical analysis of market establishment, Section 5.1, we found that the foundation of
Germany’s first universities was associated with the establishment of 40–70 additional markets be-
tween 1386 and 1406; in our analysis of the effects of the new universities on legal training in Ger-
many, Section 6.2, we estimated that there were several hundred additional legally-trained individu-
als, and 150 additional law graduates between 1386 and 1406. If 30% of the 150 graduates in law took
administrative positions, these 45 individuals, working for territorial lords with jurisdiction over
multiple cities and towns, could have had an effect on scores of cities. The potential impact of legal
training appears even larger when considering the effects of graduates working in administrative
positions in the Church, and especially the hundreds of individuals with some legal training, but no
formal degree, who worked in the administrations of small cities and towns. Thus, the transforma-
tion of administrative and legal institutions in 15th century Germany by individuals trained in law
was very plausibly significant.
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7 Conclusion
Understanding the “Rise of the West” is a monumental task, made more difficult by the fragmentary
data available for the late medieval period when it began. To begin to study the economic aspects
of the transformation of Europe requires systematic evidence on economic activity. Our evidence
on medieval German city incorporation and market establishment indicates remarkable changes in
economic activity: hundreds of markets were established in Germany during the late Middle Ages.
These data allow us to test whether medieval universities played a causal role in the increased
economic activity we observe. Medieval Germany experienced a plausibly exogenous shock to its
human capital stock through the universities established there during the Papal Schism. The evidence
presented in this paper suggests an important, causal role for universities in the development of
markets in medieval and early modern Germany.
While identifying the channel linking universities’ proximity to market establishment is difficult,
historical evidence indicates the importance of legal training provided by medieval universities. The
number of German law students dramatically increased following the establishment of the first uni-
versities there; many of them then went on to legal and administrative careers in which they helped
develop new legal institutions, thus reducing the uncertainty of engaging in trade. We suggest that
the development of formal legal institutions thus played a key role in promoting economic transfor-
mation.77
The “natural experiment” in university establishment that we analyze occurred well into the late
Middle Ages, and outside the most commercially successful parts of medieval Europe. Still, we think
that the experience of Germany in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century not only provides an
ideal testing ground due to the exogenous introduction of universities, but we also believe that these
insights reveal the importance of universities and (and legal institutions’ development) throughout
Europe in the Middle Ages. The channel from universities to legal training, to careers in public
administration and Church administration was clearly exhibited among the University of Bologna’s
medieval graduates, who came from across Europe (Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2013). With regard to
France, Swanson (1979, p. 15) writes that “universities became the training schools for the bureaucrats
77The ability of the state to employ better-trained bureaucrats is an important determinant of a state’s capacity (Brewer,
1988; Besley and Persson, 2009).
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of both secular and ecclesiastical chanceries; . . . from the beginning of the thirteenth century the law
graduates of the French provincial universities dominated the personnel of the French chancery.”
These public administrators (including those within the Church) helped to establish the political
institutions that scholars such as Berman (1983), DeLong and Shleifer (1993), and Epstein (2000) argue
were crucial to Europe’s medieval economic growth.
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A Data Appendix: Construction of Student Enrollment Numbers
Enrollments of German students at the newly founded German universities are directly available
from Toepke (1884) for Heidelberg, Keussen (1892) for Cologne, and Weissenborn (1881) for Erfurt.
Useful, general information on the interpretation of matriculation records of Germans abroad is
contained in Courtenay (2000).
For Bologna, we use the data from Friedla¨nder (1887). We assume that the number of Germans in
Padua was identical to that in Bologna, though this is likely a significant overestimate.78
For the University of Paris, data on individuals in the German-English nation who “determined”
(roughly, received the Bachelor’s degree) are available (Denifle, 1889); we assume that one-tenth of
all students determined, and that one-third of the German-English nation were from the German
lands of the Holy Roman Empire—the majority were from England, Belgium, and the Netherlands
(Denifle, 1889).
For Orle´ans, we have data on the number of German students enrolled in 1378 (Fournier, 1888).
We assume that the enrollment level was constant at the 1378 level for all years except during the
period 1384–1392 (inclusive), when the University of Paris’ enrollment of German students was re-
duced to 0, and when historical evidence indicates that the University of Orle´ans’ population of
German students was sharply reduced (see Section 3.2). During this period, we assume a two-thirds
reduction in the number of German students enrolled at Orle´ans.
For Prague, we use the matriculation records in University of Prague (1830). We sum the numbers
from the law faculty and the philosophy faculty. Students enrolled in the law faculty are recorded
with their nation of origin; we consider those hailing from the Bavarian or Saxon nation as “Ger-
mans.” Matriculation records for the philosophy faculty do not record the place of origin; we take
the numbers of students who inceperunt (began their studies) and multiply it by the share of students
from the Bavarian and Saxon nations in the law faculty.
B Theory Appendix: Derivation of the Estimation Equation
Here we provide details on the derivation of our estimating equation for our panel dataset. Using the
definition given in equation (2) of Section 4, we can write each city’s level of human capital at a point
in time as a function of its pre-Schism level of human capital, hi,1386, the post-university dummy,
Postt, each city’s change in distance to a university following the Papal Schism, ∆DistUnivi, and the
coefficients δt−j. To see this, note that for t ≤ 1386:
hi,t = −
n
∑
j=1
βt−j · distancei,t−j = −distancei,pre ·
n
∑
j=1
βt−j ≡ hi,1386
In 1387 (and analogously, for the years after 1387), the level of human capital in cities with positive
values of ∆DistUnivi can be written as:
78Rashdall (1895, p. 16) writes that following an influx of students from Bologna in the 14th century due to political
turmoil there, “the new-comers must have constituted by far the larger part of the Paduan University.”
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hi,1387 = −βt−1 · distancei,1386 − βt−2 · distancei,1385 − βt−3 · distancei,1384 − . . .
= −βt−1 · (distancei,pre − ∆DistUnivi)− βt−2 · distancei,pre − βt−3 · distancei,pre − . . .
= hi,1386 + βt−1 · ∆DistUnivi
Thus, prior to 1387, human capital in our model will be approximately flat at the level hi,1386; for
1387 and the following years, human capital is equal to:
hi,t = hi,1386 + Postt · ∆DistUnivi ·
t−1386
∑
j=1
δt−j
To simplify, we approximate the unknown series of δt−j with a time trend and plug this back into
equation (1). This yields, after redefining coefficients:
marketsi,t = α1 ·Yeart + γ (hi,1386 + ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt)
≡ h¯i,1386 + α1 ·Yeart + α7 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt
where the variable Yeart is normalized to equal 0 in the pivot year.
Though not predicted by the model, reduction in distance to a university (∆DistUnivi) and the
Papal Schism (Postt) might both be associated with characteristics that directly affect market estab-
lishment in the level, in trends, or in their interactions. To account (and test) for these possible rela-
tionships, we include level and interaction effects of ∆DistUnivi and Postt. This yields the following
equation:
marketsi,t = h¯i,1386 + α1 ·Yeart + α2 · Postt + α3 ·Yeart · Postt + α4 · ∆DistUnivi
+α5 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart + α6 · ∆DistUnivi · Postt
+α7 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt
The city-specific intercepts h¯i,1386 can be accounted for with city fixed effects. However, because
the coefficients on the interaction terms of interest are invariant to the inclusion of city fixed effects,
we do not include the fixed effects in our regressions. We therefore use the following estimation
equation:
marketsi,t = α0 + α1 ·Yeart + α2 · Postt + α3 ·Yeart · Postt + α4 · ∆DistUnivi
+α5 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart + α6 · ∆DistUnivi · Postt
+α7 · ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt + ε i,t (A.1)
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Figure 1: Indicators of economic development in the Middle Ages; urbanization rate is the percentage
of the population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants (source: Buringh and van Zanden,
2009).
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Figure 3: Absolute (10 year moving average) and cumulative number of city incorporations and
market grants, Germany.
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Figure 4: Number of German university students, 1366–1406, by location of study. “Foreign” uni-
versities are Bologna, Padua, Paris, Orle´ans, and Prague. “German” universities are Heidelberg,
Cologne, and Erfurt. See Appendix A for a discussion of sources and the assumptions underlying
these estimates.
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Figure 5: Cumulative distributions of students at the Universities of Heidelberg and Cologne, by
the distance from a student’s home diocese to the university attended (based on Fuchs, 1995, and
Keussen, 1892).
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Figure 6: Change in the linear trend rate of market establishment, whole sample (corresponding to
the regression in Table 3, column 1); and, non-parametric (LOWESS) graph of market establishment
rates.
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Figure 7: Change in the linear trend rate of market establishment, cities with a small (below median)
change in distance to the closest university (corresponding to the regression in Table 3, column 2);
and, non-parametric (LOWESS) graph of market establishment rates.
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Figure 8: Change in the linear trend rate of market establishment, cities with a large (above median)
change in distance to the closest university (corresponding to the regression in Table 3, column 3);
and, non-parametric (LOWESS) graph of market establishment rates.
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Figure 9: Changes in the trend rate of market establishment (coefficient on Yeart · Postt) under varying
pivot years, 1376–1396; for each year between 1376 and 1396, we test for a trend break in that specific
year, examining the 20 years before and after that year, as in the specification estimated in Table 3,
column 1.
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Figure 10: Changes in the trend rate of market establishment (coefficient on ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt)
under varying pivot years, 1376–1396; for each year between 1376 and 1396, we test for a trend break
in that specific year associated with ∆DistUnivi, examining the 20 years before and after that year, as
in the specification estimated in Table 3, column 4.
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Table 1: University establishments
University Location Foundation Date
Bologna end of 12th Century
Vicenza 1204
Paris beginning of 13th century
Oxford beginning of 13th century
Montpellier beginning of 13th century
Cambridge 1209–1225
Arezzo 1215
Salamanca before 1218–1219
Padua 1222
Naples 1224
Vercelli 1228
Toulouse 1229
Orle´ans around 1235
Siena 1246
Angers 1250
Lisbon 1290
Lerida 1300
Avignon 1303
Rome 1303
Perugia 1308
Pisa 1343
Prague 1347
Florence 1349
Pavia 1361
Cracow 1364
Orange 1365
Vienna 1365 (opens in 1383)
Erfurt 1379 (opens in 1392)
Heidelberg 1386
Cologne 1388
Turin 1404
Leipzig 1409
St. Andrews 1411
Rostock 1419
Louvain 1425
Basle 1459
Tu¨bingen 1476
Source: Verger (1992), pages 62–65. Universities in
the territory considered “Germany” in our dataset
in italics. The foundation dates come from Verger
(1992). Note that there is some ambiguity in the
foundation dates of many of the early universities,
so the numbers may differ slightly from those re-
ported elsewhere.
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Table 2: Economic Shocks in Germany, 1200–1500
Date Event
13th Century Creation of “commercial” schools that teach reading, arithmetic, bookkeeping
Around 1250 Creation of the legal form of a corporation in Germany
1320 Discovery of gold in Hungary, decline of the Champagne fairs
by 1345 Financial instruments such as the promissory note widely used
1348 First wave of the Black Death hits Europe
1439 Invention of printing with movable type by Johannes Gutenberg in Mainz
1470-1490 Discovery of silver in Schwaz (Tyrol) and Schneeberg (Saxony)
Sources: Cipolla (1976), North (2000), inter al.
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Table 3: Baseline estimates
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Sample: Time series Panel
< median ≥median city territory cell
∆DistUniv ∆DistUniv level level level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year -0.061 -0.025 -0.097 -0.004 0.087 0.018
[0.053] [0.059] [0.061] [0.075] [0.126] [0.051]
Post1386 0.084 0.933 -0.765 1.726 -1.101 0.396
[0.807] [1.152] [0.973] [1.553] [2.219] [1.418]
Year × Post1386 0.151** 0.015 0.287*** -0.086 -0.129 -0.068
[0.073] [0.097] [0.084] [0.138] [0.205] [0.094]
∆DistUniv -0.173 -0.808 -0.364
[0.413] [1.030] [0.250]
∆DistUniv × Year -0.032 -0.058 -0.030
[0.035] [0.060] [0.022]
∆DistUniv × Post1386 -0.937 0.017 -0.232
[0.630] [1.069] [0.593]
∆DistUniv × Year × Post1386 0.136** 0.191* 0.094*
[0.059] [0.108] [0.049]
Constant 1.225* 1.470** 0.980 1.529* 3.277 1.572***
[0.615] [0.684] [0.784] [0.829] [2.307] [0.564]
Window (years) 1386± 20
Observations 40 40 40 90240 20880 3200
Number of cities 2256 1128 1128 · · ·
Number of cross sectional units · · · 2256 522 80
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome variable in all regressions is the number of mar-
kets established per 1,000 cities (see footnote 43 for additional details). In the time series specifications
(columns 1–3), the unit of observation is the year. In the panel data specifications, the unit of obser-
vation is the city×year (column 4), the territory×year (column 5), the one-degree latitude one-degree
longitude cell×year (column 6). In columns 5 and 6, we sum the number of market establishments
for all cities in a given territory in a given year (column 5) or for all cities in a given one-degree by
one-degree cell in a given year (column 6), and then normalize the aggregate figure by the number of
cities (in thousands) in the area considered. Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors in the
panel data specifications are clustered at the level of cross-sectional units: cities (column 4), territories
(column 5), or one-degree by one-degree cells (column 6).
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Table 4: Spatial endogeneity 1: local shocks
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Sample: ≥ 20 km ≥ 50 km not in the same
from a univ. from a univ. territory
Time Panel, Time Panel, Time Panel,
series city level series city level series city level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year -0.061 -0.002 -0.048 -0.008 -0.040 0.012
[0.053] [0.075] [0.050] [0.077] [0.055] [0.076]
Post1386 0.135 1.729 0.463 1.400 -0.155 1.141
[0.810] [1.565] [0.765] [1.601] [0.853] [1.527]
Year × Post1386 0.148** -0.088 0.117 -0.058 0.127* -0.080
[0.072] [0.139] [0.071] [0.141] [0.075] [0.140]
∆DistUniv -0.167 -0.374 -0.122
[0.430] [0.467] [0.471]
∆DistUniv × Year -0.035 -0.025 -0.031
[0.037] [0.039] [0.038]
∆DistUniv × Post1386 -0.926 -0.594 -0.781
[0.650] [0.703] [0.680]
∆DistUniv × Year × Post1386 0.137** 0.111* 0.124*
[0.061] [0.064] [0.064]
Constant 1.226* 1.513* 1.096* 1.687* 1.341** 1.543*
[0.622] [0.839] [0.546] [0.861] [0.659] [0.869]
Window (years) 1386± 20
Observations 40 88800 40 81440 40 84000
Number of cities/cross sectional units 2220 2220 2036 2036 2100 2100
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome variable in all regressions is the number of markets
established per 1,000 cities in the region examined (see footnote 43 for additional details). In time series
specifications (columns 1, 3, and 5), the unit of observation is the year. In the panel data specifications
(columns 2, 4, and 6), the unit of observation is the city×year. Regions examined in the table are: all of
Germany excluding areas within 20km/50km of Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt (columns 1–4); or, all
of Germany excluding the territories belonging to the Rhenish Palatinate, the Archbishopric of Cologne,
and the Archbishopric of Mainz (columns 5–6). Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors in
the panel data specifications are clustered at the city level.
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Table 7: Placebo analyses
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Sample: England
Italy and Wales
(1) (2)
Year 0.115 0.110
[0.097] [0.075]
Post1386 0.305 -2.034*
[2.581] [1.177]
Year × Post1386 -0.008 -0.100
[0.236] [0.089]
Constant 2.521* 3.082***
[1.257] [1.014]
Window (years) 1386± 20
Observations 40 40
Number of cities 190 2254
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome vari-
able in all regressions is the number of markets estab-
lished per 1,000 cities in the region examined (see foot-
note 43 for additional details). The unit of observation
is the year. Regions examined in the table are: Italy in
column 1 (i.e., Naples, Sicily, and Lombardy); England
and Wales in column 2. Data on market establishments
in Italy come from Mira (1955); Grohmann (1969); Ep-
stein (1992); data on market establishments in England
and Wales come from Keene and Letters (2004). Robust
standard errors in brackets.
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Online Appendix (not for publication)
OA.1 Market grants and economic activity
To validate the market right as an indicator of economic activity, rather than merely a change in the
formality of economic institutions that had already existed, we begin by examining the association
between city size in 1500 (and, in other specifications, 1400) and market rights granted up to the year
1500 (or 1400). This analysis requires some background discussion. Typically, urbanization, rather
than city size, has been used to study economic development prior to the era of modern economic
growth. However, urbanization rates are unavailable for units smaller than countries prior to 1700.
Because we study market establishment at much more disaggregated levels of analysis—indeed, at
the city level—we will use the size of a city as a measure of a city’s economic development. As noted
in the main text of the paper, the data on city size are very limited in their coverage for the medieval
period, but they are still able to provide suggestive evidence on the relationship between market
establishment and economic development, with city size acting as a proxy for the latter.
We use data collected by Bairoch et al. (1988), containing city size data for 279 German cities
across the period 800–1850. To be included in the dataset, cities needed to have populations of size
5,000 or greater by the year 1800. Of these, 128 were large enough in 1500 to have available city size
data; 75 were large enough in 1400 to have city size data. We do not know with certainty that cities
without data were small; however, the ability to find city size information for a given century is a
strong indicator that the city was, indeed, relatively large.
We begin our analysis by studying the relationship between market grants and a dummy variable
indicating whether a city has city size data available in the Bairoch dataset in 1500 (or 1400). This will
tell us whether cities that were granted more market rights in the 1100–1500 period were, in fact,
“big” cities in 1500 (and whether cities granted more market rights in the 1100–1400 period were
“big” in 1400). Of course, cities that did not exist were more likely to have no population data and
no market grants; however, only 6 of the 279 cities in the Bairoch dataset had not been mentioned in
historical documents prior to 1500, and only 7 had not been mentioned prior to 1400.1 In addition,
we have conducted all of our analyses including only cities that had been incorporated prior to 1500
(or 1400), and this does not significantly change our findings.
We thus regress the “city size data available” dummy variable on the number of market rights
granted, for cities that had previously been mentioned in documents prior to 1500 (or 1400). As can
be seen in Table OA.1, column 1, there is a very strong, positive correlation between market grants
and being a big enough city to have population data in 1500. The same holds for the year 1400 (see
Table OA.1, column 5). We next run the same regressions, but using an indicator of at least one market
right granted as the explanatory variable. This is a useful robustness check given the noisiness of the
market grant data, and to ensure that our results were not driven by many grants in a particular city.
We again find a statistically significant, positive association between receiving a market grant and
being a city large enough to have population data in 1500 (see Table OA.1, column 2) or in 1400 (see
Table OA.1, column 6). We have estimated all of these specifications controlling for cities’ latitude
and longitude, and we continue to find a strong, positive association between market grants and the
city having population data. Finally, we have estimated the same relationships using probit and logit
specifications, and our results are robust to these alternative models as well.
Next, we condition on a city having population data in 1500 (or 1400), and examine the relation-
ship between market grants and city size among the 128 cities in Germany with population data in
1Information on the date a city was first mentioned comes from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
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1500 (or the 75 cities in Germany with population data in 1400). We regress log city size in 1500 on
the number of market grants a city received between 1100 and 1500, and we again find a statistically
significant, positive association (see Table OA.1, column 3); when we examine city size in 1400 and
market establishment between 1100–1400, the relationship is positive, though it is no longer signifi-
cant (see Table OA.1, column 7). We then regress city size in 1500 (or 1400) on an indicator that a city
received at least one market right between 1100 and 1500 (or 1100 and 1400), and find again a strong,
positive relationship between market rights and city size (see Table OA.1, column 4 for the year 1500
results and Table OA.1, column 8 for the year 1400 results). As was the case in our study of cities with
and without population data, our results are robust to including latitude and longitude controls.
While the analysis above can only be suggestive, it does indicate a robust association between
market rights granted and economic development at the city level in medieval Germany.
Table OA.1: City sizes and market grants
Dependent variable: City size in 1500 City size in 1400
Any size reported log(size) Any size reported log(size)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total markets granted 0.200*** 0.176* 0.251*** 0.106
[0.0449] [0.106] [0.0514] [0.132]
Any markets granted 0.601*** 0.610*** 0.514*** 0.468**
[0.0400] [0.156] [0.0822] [0.212]
Observations 273 273 128 128 272 272 75 75
R2 0.103 0.185 0.045 0.104 0.120 0.141 0.014 0.058
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. Each column shows estimates from a cross-sectional regression of a
measure of city population on that city’s level of market establishment in the Middle Ages; all regressions
include a constant term (not reported). Measures of city size are either a dummy variable indicating
whether a city had population data in 1500 (or 1400) available in the Bairoch dataset (columns 1, 2, 5, and
6) or, conditional on having city size data in 1500 (or 1400), the log of the city’s population (columns 3,
4, 7, and 8). City size data come from Bairoch et al. (1988) and market grants data were collected by the
authors from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. All cities included in these regressions had populations of size 5,000
or greater by the year 1800, and thus are included in Bairoch dataset. Regression estimates in columns 1–2
and 5–6 are based on the sample of cities that had been mentioned in documents prior to 1500, or 1400,
respectively (to ensure that the absence of city size data) is not a mechanical result of no city existing).
Regression estimates in columns 3–4, and columns 7–8, are based on the sample of cities with city size
data available in the Bairoch dataset in 1500, and in 1400, respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.
In addition to examining the relationship between market grants and city size, we examined
historical sources to determine whether the granting of a market right was associated with other
observable indicators of economic activity in the historical record (we discuss this in the main text
as well). We identified several useful sources; first, the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch and the Handbuch der
historischen Sta¨tten Deutschlands (Klose, ed, 1958–) provide descriptions of notable new construction
in each German city. Some of these are plausibly directly linked to the establishment of a functioning
market: for example, construction or fortification of city walls, construction of customs houses, and
merchants’ halls. Other construction might have been supported by increased trade, and increased
tax revenues derived from that trade: for example, the construction of a church, or a city hall.
We examined historical construction records for the cities receiving the 80 market grants and/or
city incorporations between 1386 and 1406, and find that 38 of them experienced some notable con-
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struction within 20 years of the year of the market grant or city incorporation (in Table OA.2, we list
the cities; column 4 indicates with an “X” which of these experienced notable construction). As we
discuss in the main text, the city of Bacharach received a market grant in 1402. Around that time, a
customs house was built and the city walls were extended to accommodate it. Then, five years after
the market grant, a new city hall was built on the market square. Seventeen years after the market
right was granted, a new merchants’ hall was constructed. The city of Kulmbach received a market
grant in 1397; that same year was the first time a moat around the city was mentioned, and in 1398, a
city hall and a merchant hall were mentioned for the first time. Petershagen received a market grant
in 1399; 20 years later, the nearby bridge over the Weser River needed to be expanded. Overall, it
appears that a great deal of new construction activity followed the granting of a medieval market
right, suggesting real effects of the grant.
We also randomly selected 80 “comparison” cities that did not receive a market grant or city in-
corporation between 1386 and 1406, and searched for evidence of construction activity in these cities
between 1386 and 1426 (a conservative, 40-year time window). We found evidence of construction
in only 23 of these 80 cities—the difference in construction activity between cities receiving market
grants within a twenty-year window and control cities within a forty-year window is statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level.2 This suggests that the construction activity occurring in the cities receiving
market grants truly was linked to the market establishments themselves.
We also consulted a report on the markets existing in Germany in 1936, Verzeichnis der Ma¨rkte und
Messen im Deutschen Reich im Jahre 1936 (Statistisches Reichsamt, ed, 1935) and matched the markets
in the report to the 63 market establishments in our dataset between 1386 and 1406. We find that 60 of
the cities receiving market grants from 1386–1406 had functioning markets in 1936 (see Table OA.2).
Among these 60 cities, the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch provided information on the frequency of the market,
and/or the goods traded there, for 50 of their medieval market grants. Of these 50 grants, we are
able to successfully match 39 of them across 500 years on at least one market characteristic (frequency
or goods traded), with no mismatch; moreover, in 14 cases, we find that the market existing in 1936
exactly matches the 14th (or early 15th) century market grant in both the frequency and type of market
(see Table OA.2). These findings indicate that market grants to small towns were not formalities, but
rather produced functioning markets. The small towns receiving these grants continued to have
functioning markets over 500 years later, and frequently their medieval markets persisted into the
20th century.
Thus, based on a range of historical evidence, we are confident that the granting of a market right
generally indicates increased commercial activity.3
2When limiting the window of analysis for the comparison cities to the 20 year period 1386–1406, one finds 19 instances
of construction activity; the difference between this level of activity and that for the treatment cities is statistically significant
at 1%.
3As we also note in the main text, we are not the first to treat the granting of a market privilege as an event marking
market establishment. The work of historians of medieval Europe studying such grants supports the view that royal
charters were often associated with the actual creation of new markets, and were not simply the formal recognition of
existing ones. Bindseil and Pfeil (1999, pp. 739-740) write that “The setting up of a marketplace became a legal privilege of
the German King in the 9th century, implying the need of a deed of foundation for every market.” Britnell (1981, p. 211)
and Masschaele (2002) discuss the case of England; Epstein (2000) uses legal documents as indicators of economic activity
in Italy.
OA.3
Table OA.2: Cities incorporated and/or granted markets, 1386–
1406
City State Y
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Panel A: Cities incorporated, 1386–1406
Abensberg Bayern 1401 X – –
Altdorf Bayern 1387 X – – X
Bad Liebenzell Wu¨rttemberg 1388 X – –
Boxberg Baden 1388 X – –
Breckerfeld Westfalen 1396 X – – X
Hammerstein Pommern 1395 X – – X
Hattingen Westfalen 1396 X – – X
Hirschberg Thu¨ringen 1397 X – –
Hirschhorn Hessen 1391 X – –
Ko¨lleda Sachsen-Anhalt 1392 X – – X
Otterndorf Niedersachsen 1400 X – –
Plettenberg Westfalen 1397 X – – X
Scheinfeld Bayern 1405 X – – X
Treuen i. V. Sachsen 1390 X – –
Ummerstadt Thu¨ringen 1394 X – –
Veringenstadt Wu¨rttemberg 1393 X – –
Wa¨chtersbach Hessen 1404 X – – X
Panel B: Cities incorporated and granted markets, 1386–1406
Alzenau Bayern 1401 X X no
Aub Bayern 1404 X X X yes
Gaildorf Wu¨rttemberg 1404 X X X yes X
Groß-Gerau Hessen 1398 X X X likely
Hadmersleben Sachsen-Anhalt 1390 X X X .
Thiersheim Bayern 1398 X X X no X
Panel C: Cities granted markets, 1386–1406
Aalen Wu¨rttemberg 1398 X X yes X
Auerbach i.d.Opf. Bayern 1397 X X yes X
Bu¨hl Baden 1403 X X likely
Bacharach Rheinland-Pfalz 1403 X X no X
Besigheim Wu¨rttemberg 1405 X X likely X
Bischofswerda Sachsen 1406 X X likely
Bogen Bayern 1389 X X yes
Burgsteinfurt Westfalen 1406 X X likely X
Esslingen/Neckar Wu¨rttemberg 1388 X X . X
Fraustadt Schlesien 1404 X X likely
Freystadt Bayern 1393 X X yes
Friedberg Bayern 1404 X X yes X
Continued on next page
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Table OA.2: (continued)
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Gerbstedt Sachsen-Anhalt 1404 X X yes X
Gunzenhausen Bayern 1401 X X likely
Hirschhorn Hessen 1404 X X no X
Ichenhausen Bayern 1406 X X .
Ingolstadt Bayern 1395 X X yes
Ku¨lsheim Baden 1405 X X likely
Kelheim Bayern 1399 X X likely
Kulmbach Bayern 1398 X X likely X
Lu¨chow Niedersachsen 1398 X X .
Lauchheim Wu¨rttemberg 1402 X X likely
Liebenau Hessen 1393 X X no X
Limburg Hessen 1403 X X likely
Lo¨rrach Baden 1403 X X no X
Mainburg Bayern 1397 X X likely
Meppen Westfalen 1387 X X no
Merkendorf Bayern 1398 X X yes X
Meschede Niedersachsen 1399 X X no
Moringen Niedersachsen 1390 X X likely
Neumarkt Schlesien 1387 X X . X
Neustadt Rheinland-Pfalz 1404 X X no
Neustadt a.d.Waldnaab Bayern 1387 X no
Petershagen Westfalen 1400 X X . X
Philippsburg Baden 1402 X X no
Pirna Sachsen 1392 X X likely X
Pleystein Bayern 1391 X X yes
Pressath Bayern 1398 X X likely
Radevormwald Rheinland 1400 X X likely
Rain Bayern 1397 X X no X
Rastatt Baden 1404 X X .
Regensburg-Stadtamhof Bayern 1389 X X yes
Rinteln Westfalen 1392 X X likely X
Roth b. Nu¨rnberg Bayern 1392 X X likely X
Rothenburg o.d. Tauber Bayern 1406 X X yes X
Rottenburg a.d. Laaber Bayern 1393 X X likely X
Rottweil Wu¨rttemberg 1397 X X likely X
So¨mmerda Sachsen-Anhalt 1389 X X . X
Scheßlitz Bayern 1395 X X . X
Schweinfurt Bayern 1397 X X likely X
Solingen-Gra¨frath Rheinland 1402 X no
Soltau Niedersachsen 1388 X X .
Thum Sachsen 1407 X X no
Vilsbiburg Bayern 1401 X X likely X
Continued on next page
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Table OA.2: (continued)
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Vilseck Bayern 1396 X X likely X
Volkach Bayern 1406 X X likely X
Weißenhorn Bayern 1387 X X yes
Table includes cities incorporated and/or granted market rights between 1386 and 1406 (incorporations and
market grants taken from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch). For each city, it is first indicated whether incorporation
or the granting of a market right (or both) occurred between 1386 and 1406, along with the date when this
event (or these events) occurred. Next, for cities that received a market grant between 1386 and 1406, we
indicate whether Verzeichnis der Ma¨rkte und Messen im Deutschen Reich im Jahre 1936 identifies a market in
that city in 1936. If information on the timing of the medieval market or the goods traded at the market (or
both) is available in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, the table next shows whether the medieval market and the 1936
market match: “yes” indicates a match on both timing and goods traded; “likely” indicates a match on one
characteristic and no mismatch on timing or goods traded; “no” indicates a discrepancy between the medieval
market and the 1936 market in timing or goods traded (or the non-existence of a market in 1936); a dot indicates
that no information on timing or goods traded is available for the medieval market. Finally, the table indicates
whether the city experienced a significant construction event within 20 years of its incorporation or receiving
a market grant (information on construction activity comes from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch and the Handbuch der
historischen Sta¨tten Deutschlands).
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OA.2 Universities and urbanization across Europe
We argue in the main text of the paper that our analysis of the impact of German universities on mar-
ket establishment can speak to the larger question of the causal effect of universities on the Commer-
cial Revolution across Europe. Although the establishment of Europe’s universities was generally
endogenous with respect to economic activity (as we discuss in the main text), it remains of inter-
est to examine the (non-causal) relationship between universities and economic development across
countries in medieval Europe.
To study the relationship between universities and economic development, we use data from Bur-
ingh and van Zanden (2009) on the number of universities and the urbanization rate in each European
“country”, in each century, from 1200–1500.4 We first present the scatterplot of urbanization against
the number of universities, century by century (see Figure OA.1). In each century, there appears to
be a positive association between the number of universities in a country and its urbanization rate.
One can see that Belgium stands out as a clear outlier, having a very high urbanization rate, but no
universities until the University of Louvain was established in 1425 (the Netherlands are an outlier
as well in the later centuries). Without Belgium, the correlation of urbanization and the number of
universities is strikingly high, being close to 0.8 in most periods considered. Of course, Belgian (and
Dutch) students could – and did – attend universities in nearby France and Germany. Even with
these outliers, the general association between universities and economic development during the
Commercial Revolution is quite clear.
We then estimate cross-sectional regressions of urbanization on the number of universities, century-
by-century, for the 1200–1500 period. In Table OA.3, Panel A, one can see that the relationship is
positive in 3 of 4 regressions, and statistically significantly so in 2 of them. When we remove Belgium
from the regression, all 4 regressions show positive relationships between universities and urbaniza-
tion, 3 of them statistically significant (see Table OA.3, Panel B).5
It is important to emphasize that these associations should not be interpreted as causal – they
merely indicate that the European countries that had the most universities were also the most urban-
ized throughout the Middle Ages. Our goal in studying Germany in the late 14th century is to exploit
a case of plausibly exogenous variation in the existence of universities to identify the causal role that
universities played in economic development in medieval Europe.
4Note that as in the main text, the urbanization rate is calculated as the fraction of the population in the country living
in cities with populations 10,000 or larger.
5Examining the relationship between universities and urbanization in 1100 (with or without Belgium) yields a highly
significant, positive relationship. The only country with a university, Italy, has the highest urbanization rate in the sample.
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Figure OA.1: Urbanization rates and number of universities, 1200–1500.
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Table OA.3: Urbanization rates and number of universities, 1200–1500
Dependent variable: Urbanization rate (%)
1200 1300 1400 1500
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Num. of universities 2.393*** 0.866** 0.286 -0.0255
[0.554] [0.272] [0.374] [0.395]
Observations 10 10 10 10
R2 0.380 0.285 0.040 0.000
Panel B: Excluding Belgium
Num. of universities 2.855*** 1.091*** 0.614*** 0.308
[0.258] [0.116] [0.111] [0.229]
Observations 9 9 9 9
R2 0.809 0.820 0.760 0.234
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. Each column shows es-
timates from a cross-sectional regression of the “country”-level
urbanization rate on the number of universities. All regressions
include a constant term (not reported). Data on the number of
universities and the urbanization rate in each European “coun-
try” come from Buringh and van Zanden (2009). Robust stan-
dard errors in brackets.
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OA.3 German University Graduates Before and After 1386: Evidence from the Reperto-
rium Academicum Germanicum
As noted in the main text, we believe that the number university students, rather than graduates, is
a better measure of the human capital being produced in the medieval universities. Still, available
data on university graduates provide an alternative measure of university training that can comple-
ment the matriculation record data that we focus on in the main text. The Repertorium Academicum
Germanicum (RAG) database includes a great deal of information on German university graduates in
the Middle Ages, though the database’s search functionality is still being developed.6 We searched
the RAG database for all German university graduates between 1366 and 1385 (all from foreign uni-
versities), and find 877 graduates; the same search for graduates between 1387 and 1406 yields 1,623
graduates.7 The data on German graduates from the RAG database corroborates the evidence on
university students from matriculation records.
To provide additional evidence on the change in the number of Germans trained in law following
the establishment of Germany’s first universities, we can again turn to the RAG database to estimate
how many German law graduates there were before and after 1386. These individuals were very
much the elite—Wieacker (1995, p. 119) notes that, “Imperial law placed the legal doctor on a par
with the knight.” We searched the RAG database for all German university law graduates between
1366 and 1385 (all of whom attended foreign universities), and find 72 graduates; the same search for
graduates between 1387 and 1406 yields 233 graduates.8 The RAG data show that while the number
of German university graduates nearly doubled after 1386, the number of graduates in law more than
tripled.
6The RAG database is online at http://www.rag-online.org/, and contains the biographies of scholars from the Holy
Roman Empire from 1250 until 1550.
7To be precise, to conduct this search, we specified the range of years in which degrees were granted, and included an
asterisk (a “wild card”) under the graduate’s last name. Other search parameters yield different numbers, but the same
pattern of a large increase in graduates after 1386. The search engine is still being perfected and currently does not allow for
a sharp distinction of Boolean searches of the “and” and the “or” type (personal correspondence with the administrators
of the RAG, 2013/05/14).
8To be precise, to conduct this search, we specified the range of years in which degrees were granted, required that
degrees be in law (“jur”) and included an asterisk (a “wild card”) under the graduate’s last name. Other search parameters
yield different numbers, but the same pattern of a large increase in graduates in law after 1386.
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OA.4 Units of analysis and clustering city-year level regressions at the territory level
As noted in the text, our choice of city-year as the unit of analysis in our panel regressions raises con-
cerns about the statistical inferences we make (i.e., how many independent observations we have)
and general equilibrium effects (i.e., the possibility that units’ interdependence biases our coeffi-
cients). In this section we replicate our panel regressions of Tables 4 through 6, but using different
units of analysis, or clustering our standard errors at different levels.
We first, in Table OA.4, present results from estimating specifications presented in Tables 4 through 6,
but using territory-year as the unit of analysis. One can see that our results are very similar to those
presented in the main text.
Next, we estimate the same specifications, but using cell-year as the unit of analysis. One can see
that our results are again similar to those presented in the main text (see Table OA.5).
Finally, we estimate the specifications presented in Tables 4 through 6 using city-year data as in the
text, but clustering our standard errors at the territory level to account for possibly correlated error
terms across observations in an entire territory, across space or time. One can see that the magnitudes
of the standard errors and our statistical inferences are largely unchanged using this specification (see
Table OA.6).
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OA.5 Above/below median split sample results for spatial endogeneity, robustness re-
sults, and placebo regressions.
Our baseline results in Table 3 indicated that Germany experienced a break in the trend rate of market
establishment in 1386; that this break was concentrated in cities with a change in distance to a uni-
versity in 1386 greater than the median; and, we saw that in panel regressions, there was generally a
significantly greater trend break in places with larger reductions in distance to a university in 1386.
Because our panel regression contained much of the information presented in the split sample
results, we omitted many of the latter from the main text. Here, we present the equivalent split
sample regressions for the time series specifications in Tables 4 through 6.
One can see that our time series evidence, showing a break in the trend rate of market establish-
ment for all of Germany, is indeed driven by trend breaks specifically in areas with changes in dis-
tance to a university in 1386 that were greater than the median (see Table OA.7). This is true across
all specifications, providing further evidence in support of our hypothesis that increased access to
universities after 1386 significantly affected economic activity.
Moreover, in Figures OA.2 and OA.3 we report the same placebo analysis of Figure 9 (examining
the effect of varying the year defining the Postt dummy from 1376 to 1396) separately for the samples
of cities above and below median ∆DistUnivi. Again, one can see that there is a break in trend
concentrated on the years around 1386 for the cities with a large change in distance to a university,
but no significant break in trend for any of the years 1376–1396 in the sample of cities below median
∆DistUnivi.
OA.15
T
ab
le
O
A
.7
:
A
g
g
re
g
at
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s,
sp
li
t
sa
m
p
le
(a
b
o
v
e
an
d
b
el
o
w
m
ed
ia
n
∆
D
is
tU
n
iv
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
R
at
e
o
f
m
ar
k
et
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
t
E
q
u
iv
al
en
t
to
:
T
4,
co
l.
1
T
4,
co
l.
3
T
4,
co
l.
5
T
5,
co
l.
1
T
5,
co
l.
3
T
6,
co
l.
1
T
6,
co
l.
3
T
6,
co
l.
5
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
P
an
el
A
:B
el
ow
m
ed
ia
n
∆
D
is
tU
n
iv
Y
ea
r
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
45
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
25
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
59
]
[0
.0
61
]
P
o
st
13
86
0.
93
3
0.
93
7
0.
38
6
1.
06
5
1.
93
8
0.
88
8
1.
02
1
0.
96
2
[1
.1
52
]
[1
.1
58
]
[1
.1
19
]
[1
.2
09
]
[1
.8
99
]
[1
.1
52
]
[1
.1
57
]
[1
.1
88
]
Y
ea
r
×
P
o
st
13
86
0.
01
5
0.
01
5
0.
01
7
-0
.0
02
0.
03
4
0.
01
1
0.
01
8
0.
01
6
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
98
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.1
04
]
[0
.1
55
]
[0
.0
97
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.1
00
]
C
o
n
st
an
t
1.
47
0*
*
1.
47
6*
*
1.
50
6*
*
1.
52
5*
*
1.
92
2*
1.
47
2*
*
1.
43
6*
*
1.
51
5*
*
[0
.6
84
]
[0
.6
87
]
[0
.7
02
]
[0
.7
10
]
[1
.1
05
]
[0
.6
85
]
[0
.6
63
]
[0
.7
05
]
W
in
d
o
w
(y
ea
rs
)
13
86
±
20
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
N
.o
f
ci
ti
es
11
28
11
23
11
04
10
87
66
8
11
26
11
03
10
94
P
an
el
B
:A
bo
ve
m
ed
ia
n
∆
D
is
tU
n
iv
Y
ea
r
-0
.0
99
-0
.0
76
-0
.0
76
-0
.0
79
-0
.1
00
-0
.0
97
-0
.0
98
-0
.1
31
**
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.0
53
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
58
]
[0
.0
64
]
P
o
st
13
86
-0
.6
89
-0
.1
21
-0
.7
56
-0
.2
75
-0
.7
91
-1
.0
36
-0
.6
33
-0
.4
76
[0
.9
88
]
[0
.9
10
]
[1
.0
65
]
[0
.8
91
]
[1
.0
06
]
[0
.9
57
]
[1
.0
03
]
[0
.9
44
]
Y
ea
r
×
P
o
st
13
86
0.
28
6*
**
0.
24
1*
**
0.
24
8*
**
0.
23
6*
**
0.
29
7*
**
0.
28
9*
**
0.
26
1*
**
0.
32
7*
**
[0
.0
84
]
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.0
89
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
87
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
95
]
C
o
n
st
an
t
0.
97
4
0.
62
8
1.
15
7
0.
81
9
1.
01
3
0.
98
4
0.
90
7
0.
70
6
[0
.8
07
]
[0
.6
58
]
[0
.8
84
]
[0
.6
59
]
[0
.8
11
]
[0
.7
88
]
[0
.8
31
]
[0
.6
31
]
W
in
d
o
w
(y
ea
rs
)
13
86
±
20
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
N
.o
f
ci
ti
es
10
92
91
3
99
6
93
8
10
91
11
23
98
1
93
9
*:
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
at
10
%
;
**
:
5%
;
**
*:
1%
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s.
C
f.
n
o
te
s
to
th
e
eq
u
iv
al
en
t
ta
b
le
s
in
th
e
m
ai
n
p
ap
er
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
as
m
ar
k
et
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
p
er
y
ea
r
p
er
1,
00
0
ci
ti
es
in
th
e
re
g
io
n
co
n
si
d
er
ed
.
OA.16
!"
!#
$
!#
!"
%
&
'
((
)*
)'
+
,-
&
+
-.
&
/
,0
1
'
2
3
4567 4584 4587 4594 4597
:'23
Figure OA.2: Changes in the trend rate of market establishment (coefficient on Yeart · Postt) under
varying pivot years, 1376–1396, examining only cities with below-median values of ∆DistUniv; for
each year between 1376 and 1396, we test for a trend break in that specific year, examining the 20
years before and after that year, as in the specification estimated in Table 3, column 2.
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Figure OA.3: Changes in the trend rate of market establishment (coefficient on Yeart · Postt) under
varying pivot years, 1376–1396, examining only cities with above-median values of ∆DistUniv; for
each year between 1376 and 1396, we test for a trend break in that specific year, examining the 20
years before and after that year, as in the specification estimated in Table 3, column 3.
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OA.6 Robustness of the Empirical Results
We now examine whether our baseline results in Table 3 are robust to alternative specifications. We
first consider changing the window of time around 1386 that we examine. In Table OA.8, columns 1
and 2, we replicate our estimates in Table 3, columns 1 and 4, but consider a±15 year window, rather
than a ±20 year window. We find even stronger results using this narrower window than in the
baseline specification. If a time window of ±25 years is considered instead, one finds a positive (but
statistically insignificant) break in the trend rate of market establishment, and a small, positive (but
insignificant) coefficient on ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt (Table OA.8, columns 3 and 4).
These results, especially the strong results for the narrower time window, are reassuring in their
qualitative similarity to our findings in Table 3. In interpreting the weaker results in columns 3 and 4,
it is worth keeping in mind that we model market establishment across time using linear trends (and
breaks in trends). As the time window under consideration becomes wider, it is more likely that
other economic shocks are captured in the data, and that our linear approximation of trend rates of
economic activity (and breaks thereof) is less appropriate.9
Still we can estimate a version of our time series model across a longer time period, controlling
for smooth changes in underlying economic activity using higher-order polynomials. Our regres-
sion equation will be equivalent to the simple time-series setup of equation (4), with the addition of
higher-order terms in Yeart and higher-order interaction terms in Yeart · Postt:
marketst = β0 +
K
∑
k=1
β1,k ·Year
k
t + β2 · Postt +
K
∑
k=1
β3,k ·Year
k
t · Postt + ηt, (OA.1)
where K = 1 is equivalent to the linear approximation setup of equation (4), K = 2 is equivalent
to an approximation of time trends with a quadratic polynomial, K = 3 to a cubic polynomial, etc.
Additionally, with the variable Yeart normalized to equal 0 in 1386, the (local) trend break in 1386
can be easily represented by the coefficient on the interaction term Yeart · Postt, β3,1.
10 Our model of
the impact of new universities on human capital and market establishment will still predict a sharp,
local change in the trend rate of market establishment in 1386; thus, we expect a significant, positive
coefficient on Yeart · Postt.
11
We first estimate the (time series) model in Table OA.8, column 3, which examines a ±25 year
window around 1386, but now we control for economic activity using a quadratic time trend (which
may change post-1386). In Table OA.9, column 1, one can see that controlling for a quadratic trend
over the longer window, there is a statistically significant, positive (local) trend break in market es-
tablishment in 1386. In column 2, we increase the size of the window to ±50 years, and control for
underlying activity using a cubic polynomial (again, allowing the coefficients on the polynomial to
change post-1386). Again, we find a significant, positive (local) trend break in market establishment
in 1386. Finally, in columns 3 and 4, we increase the size of the window to±75 and±100 years respec-
tively, and again control for underlying activity using a cubic polynomial; again we find significant,
9In fact, the R-squared is decreasing in the size of the window considered: in Table OA.8, column 1 (±15 year window),
it is 0.167; in Table 3, column 1 (the ±20 year window), it is 0.098; in Table OA.8, column 3 (±25 year window), it is only
0.034.
10Formally, β3,1 is the difference in slopes between the polynomial on the left side of 1386 and the polynomial on the
right side of 1386, evaluated at Yeart = 0 (i.e., 1386).
11Admittedly, this exercise can only be suggestive, as the coefficient on Yeart · Postt is being estimated using variation
that is not just local variation around 1386.
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positive trend breaks in 1386.
We next consider the robustness of our baseline results to varying the definition of our outcome
variable. In many cases, the incorporation of a city was explicitly linked to the creation of a market;
if evidence of both could be found in the Sta¨dtebuch, this will be reflected both in our city incorpo-
rations and our market grants data. But in some cases, no explicit mention of markets is made in
the Sta¨dtebuch when a city incorporation is reported; to the extent that the city charters implicitly in-
cluded the rights to hold a certain number of markets or fairs, therefore, our market grant data may
underestimate the actual number of new markets.
To check whether this ambiguity affects our results, we estimate our baseline specifications (Ta-
ble 3, columns 1 and 4), but use the sum of the market establishments and city incorporations in a
given year (or city-year) as the outcome variable. The results in Table OA.10, columns 1 and 2, again
show a significant break in the trend rate of market establishment in 1386, and a greater positive
trend break in areas with greater reductions in distance to a university. At the same time, there is
now a marginally significant negative pre-1386 trend associated with distance to a university. This
could raise concerns to the extent that one would like areas with greater reductions in distance to
a university to be identical to areas with less. In practice, the negative trend in city incorporation
(recall there was no significant trend in market establishment itself) likely biases results against our
hypothesis.12
The baseline results might also be biased by a few instances of multiple market grants to a city
(perhaps with high values of ∆DistUniv) in a single year. In Table OA.10, columns 3 and 4, we
thus estimate our baseline specifications using an indicator of any market establishment (computed
as a rate per 1,000 cities) as our outcome, rather than the total number of markets established in a
city-year. Our estimated coefficients are slightly smaller, but we continue to see a positive, highly
statistically significant break in trend that is greatest in areas with large reductions in distance to a
university.
12If areas with high ∆DistUniv had fewer cities established just before 1386, this may have meant fewer places where
markets would then be granted after 1386.
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Table OA.8: Different windows of analysis (linear time trends)
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Time Panel, Time Panel,
series city level series city level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year -0.192* -0.047 -0.035 -0.025
[0.095] [0.092] [0.035] [0.055]
Post1386 0.933 2.51 0.368 1.335
[0.843] [1.629] [0.761] [1.359]
Year × Post1386 0.274** -0.106 0.064 0.006
[0.122] [0.165] [0.050] [0.095]
∆DistUniv -0.454 0.04
[0.426] [0.384]
∆DistUniv × Year -0.082 -0.006
[0.057] [0.023]
∆DistUniv × Post1386 -0.9 -0.552
[0.729] [0.547]
∆DistUniv × Year × Post1386 0.216** 0.033
[0.096] [0.036]
Constant 0.418 1.214 1.410** 1.339*
[0.635] [0.815] [0.589] [0.789]
Window (years) 1386± 15 1386± 25
Observations 30 67680 50 112800
Number of cities/cross sectional units 2256 2256 2256 2256
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome variable in all regressions is
the number of market establishments per 1,000 cities in the region examined (see
footnote 43 for additional details). In time series specifications (columns 1 and 3), the
unit of observation is the year. In the panel data specifications (columns 2 and 4), the
unit of observation is the city×year. Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard
errors in the panel data specifications are clustered at the city level.
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Table OA.9: Expanded windows of analysis (polynomial time trends)
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Quadratic Cubic Cubic Cubic
Time trend approximation: Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year × Post1386 (=difference in slopes around 1386) 0.493** 0.449*** 0.173* 0.177***
[0.214] [0.168] [0.089] [0.060]
Window (years) 1386± 25 1386± 50 1386± 75 1386± 100
Observations 50 100 150 200
Number of cities 2256 2256 2256 2256
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome variable in all regressions is the number of markets estab-
lished per 1,000 cities in the region examined (see footnote 43 for additional details). The unit of observation
in all regressions is the year. Coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables (cf. equation (OA.1))
omitted. Robust standard errors in brackets.
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Table OA.10: Robustness to definition of the outcome variable
Dependent variable: Rate of market Rate of market
establishment and establishment
city incorporation (indicator)
Time Panel, Time Panel,
series city level series city level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year -0.117* 0.015 -0.035 0.026
[0.062] [0.081] [0.024] [0.046]
Post1386 0.084 1.211 -0.061 0.3
[0.904] [1.672] [0.466] [0.810]
Year × Post1386 0.201** -0.11 0.093** -0.083
[0.084] [0.138] [0.039] [0.069]
∆DistUniv -0.336 -0.412
[0.479] [0.262]
∆DistUniv × Year -0.075* -0.035
[0.043] [0.022]
∆DistUniv × Post1386 -0.643 -0.206
[0.700] [0.355]
∆DistUniv × Year × Post1386 0.177*** 0.100***
[0.064] [0.033]
Constant 1.808** 2.396*** 0.852** 1.574**
[0.750] [0.919] [0.345] [0.616]
Window (years) 1386± 20
Observations 40 90240 40 90240
Number of cities/cross sectional units 2256 2256 2256 2256
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome variable in all regressions is
the number of economic “events” per 1,000 cities in the region examined (equiva-
lently to the normalization of the number of markets; see footnote 43 for additional
details). “Events” are the sum of market establishments and city incorporations
(columns 1–2), or indicators of at least one market being established in a city (so any
city receiving multiple market grants in a given year is coded as experiencing a sin-
gle “event”; columns 3–4). In time series specifications (columns 1 and 3), the unit of
observation is the year. In the panel data specifications (columns 2 and 4), the unit
of observation is the city×year. Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors
in the panel data specifications are clustered at the city level.
OA.22
OA.7 Full-sample tests of heterogeneous trend breaks across German cities
In the main text, we examine a range of explanations for the positive trend breaks in market establish-
ment that we find, other than the increased human capital following the establishment of universities
in 1386. We consider a range of alternatives:
• universities may have been established in cities that were expected to experience greater eco-
nomic activity
• territorial lords establishing universities may have administered their regions differently, or
may have been differentially affected by the Schism
• our results may have been driven by regional differences: areas near the Rhine may have driven
our results, and areas east of the Elbe may have done so as well
• changes in city jurisdiction might have produced market grants that were indicative of political
changes, rather than economic change
• cross-city conflicts may have produced trade-diverting market establishments
• finally, cities loyal to the Avignon Pope may have received market grants for political reasons
To determine whether these alternative explanations for variation in economic activity were likely
drivers of our findings, in the main text we dropped particular subsets of cities from our analysis,
and found that no set of potentially “problematic” cities seemed to drive our findings (see Tables 4
through 6).13 As a check of those findings, we now test whether allowing these various sub-groups
of cities to experience their own trend rates of economic activity (and their own trend breaks in 1386)
affects our findings in our standard panel data analysis. Rather than dropping these groups of cities
from the analysis all together, we use our entire sample of cities and test whether our findings in the
main text are preserved when accounting for these various subgroups of cities’ possibly divergent
economic paths.
To be precise, we estimate the model in Table 3, column 4, but include the interaction of Yeart ·
Postt with an indicator that a city belongs to a particular subgroup (we examine one subgroup at a
time, as in the main text, and we include all lower-order interactions). As in the main text, our model
predicts that the coefficient on ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt will be positive and statistically significant. In
Table OA.11, columns 1–8, we show the results of estimating our panel model allowing the 8 different
groups of cities dropped in the text to have their own trend rates of economic activity. In every case,
we continue to find a positive, statistically significant coefficient on ∆DistUnivi ·Yeart · Postt (except
for the marginally insignificant case of column (2)), providing further evidence that the human capital
produced in universities drove the trend breaks we identified, rather than the alternatives proposed.
13Note that in addition to merely dropping cities to test among hypotheses, we also examined pre-1386 trend rates of
market establishment in cities with different ∆DistUnivi; we allowed trend breaks in market establishment to vary with
longitude, and exploited only within-state variation; and, we examined market establishment in Italy and England around
the time of the Papal Schism, to rule out alternative explanations of our findings.
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OA.8 Using within-state variation
In the main text, we consider a specification that adds to our baseline specification state-specific time
trends, as well as state-specific breaks of the trend in 1386 (results are presented in Table 5, column
6). We adopt the division of Germany into 18 states, as in the volumes of the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch:
these states are Bavaria, Baden, Wu¨rttemberg, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Rhineland,
Westphalia, Lower Saxony (including Bremen), Schleswig-Holstein (including Hamburg), Saxony,
Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg (including Berlin), Mecklenburg, Silesia, and Pomerania
(for the vast majority of cases, these states correspond to present-day La¨nder in the Federal Republic
of Germany). Here, we provide a map showing these 18 states, and the locations of cities within
them, see Figure OA.4.
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OA.9 The impact of political shocks outside of Germany
In the main text, we discuss the impact of political changes within Germany (the impact of the Papal
Schism, of jurisdictional changes, and of inter-city conflict) on patterns of market establishment. Of
course, political shocks outside of Germany may have had spillover effects, affecting patterns of Ger-
man trade, and thus market establishment. One important event overlapping with the Papal Schism
was the political rise of Burgundy following the establishment of Philip II as Duke in 1363. One might
worry that political change in Burgundy could have affected the German lands we study: perhaps
trade increased in German cities near Burgundy around this time; because the cities in the western
part of Germany had larger values of ∆DistUnivi, this could have generated the trend break we find.
To determine whether this was likely to have driven our results, we estimate our specifications
from Table 3, columns 1 and 4, but drop all cities in the state of Baden, which was the German
territory closest to Burgundy, and the most likely to have been affected by political shifts there. We
find that excluding the cities in Baden has very little effect on the coefficients of interest; we continue
to observe a positive trend break in 1386, concentrated in cities experiencing a large reduction in
distance to a university (see Table OA.12, columns 1 and 2).
Another important political event of the late 14th century was the revolt of Flanders (see, for
example, Cohn (2006, pp. 225-227)). One might wonder if conflict in Flanders redirected trade toward
the adjacent, western parts of Germany, thus generating the pattern of market establishment we
observe. To address this concern, we estimate the specifications in Table 3, columns 1 and 4, but drop
all cities west of Du¨sseldorf (6 degrees, 47 minutes, east longitude). We find that our main results are
practically unaffected (see Table OA.12, columns 3 and 4).
The reign of Jogaila (Wladyslaw II Jagiello of Poland), beginning in the late 14th century and
marking the beginning of Poland’s “Golden Age,” roughly coincided with the Papal Schism, and
might have affected economic activity in Germany. However, we do not believe it drives our results:
when we dropped the regions of Germany east of the Elbe (in Table 5, columns 3 and 4), which
were most likely to have been affected by political change in Poland, we find that our results are
unchanged.
Finally, the Hundred Years’ War, waged between France and England throughout the period we
study, was also unlikely to have generated our results: by the 1380s, the War was focused on Calais,
quite far from the territories we study. To the extent that the War affected German trade, it was most
likely to do so in the western part of Germany; yet, as noted above, dropping cities west of Du¨sseldorf
does not affect our results. Moreover, as also noted above, the most important political changes in
France at the time occurred in Burgundy, and dropping German cities closest to Burgundy does not
change our results.
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Table OA.12: Accounting for external political shocks
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Sample: excluding excluding
Baden “close” to Flanders
Panel, Panel,
city level city level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year -0.058 -0.011 -0.060 -0.004
[0.059] [0.077] [0.054] [0.075]
Post1386 0.205 1.879 0.084 1.752
[0.873] [1.596] [0.832] [1.561]
Year × Post1386 0.125 -0.090 0.154** -0.090
[0.082] [0.140] [0.075] [0.138]
∆DistUniv -0.097 -0.147
[0.433] [0.431]
∆DistUniv × Year -0.027 -0.033
[0.036] [0.037]
∆DistUniv × Post1386 -0.975 -0.977
[0.655] [0.650]
∆DistUniv × Year × Post1386 0.125** 0.143**
[0.061] [0.061]
Constant 1.345* 1.511* 1.266* 1.517*
[0.670] [0.853] [0.633] [0.836]
Window (years) 1386± 20
Observations 40 85160 40 87440
Number of cities/cross sectional units 2129 2129 2186 2186
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The outcome variable in all regressions is
the number of market establishments per 1,000 cities in the region examined (see
footnote 43 for additional details). In time series specifications (columns 1 and 3), the
unit of observation is the year. In the panel data specifications (columns 2 and 4), the
unit of observation is the city×year. Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard
errors in the panel data specifications are clustered at the city level.
OA.28
OA.10 England and Italy falsification exercises, using 1378 as the pivot year
Our test for a break in the trend rate of market establishment in Italy or England and Wales in 1386
was intended to check whether places experiencing the Schism, but not experiencing university foun-
dations as a result, also experienced changed rates of market establishment.
Of course, the pivot year we used was chosen to fit specifically German circumstances (the slight
delay between the year of the Schism and the foundation of Germany’s first universities). If the
Papal Schism affected market establishment in England and Wales or in Italy, it might have done so
immediately. We thus estimate the specifications in Table 7, but use 1378 as the pivot year used to
define Postt. We again find no effect of the Papal Schism on market establishment in England and
Wales or in Italy, providing further evidence that without university establishment as a consequence,
the Papal Schism did not significantly affect economic activity (see Table OA.13).
Table OA.13: Robustness of placebo analyses
Dependent variable: Rate of market establishment
Sample: England
Italy and Wales
(1) (2)
Year -0.087 -0.020
[0.064] [0.034]
Post1378 2.161 1.742*
[1.373] [0.954]
Year × Post1378 0.119 -0.079
[0.145] [0.072]
Window (years) 1378± 20
Observations 40 40
Number of cities 190 2254
*: Significant at 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. Both regressions
estimate the baseline time series specification (Table 3,
column 1), except that 1378 is used as the “pivot year”
defining the Postt dummy variable. The outcome vari-
able in the regressions is the number of markets estab-
lished per 1,000 cities (see footnote 43 for additional de-
tails). The unit of observation is the year. Regions ex-
amined in the table are: Italy in column 1 (i.e., Naples,
Sicily, and Lombardy); England and Wales in column 2.
Data on market establishments in Italy come from Mira
(1955); Grohmann (1969); Epstein (1992); data on mar-
ket establishments in England and Wales come from
Keene and Letters (2004). Robust standard errors in
brackets.
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